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Abstract
Mobile devices have evolved from an accessory to the primary computing device for an
increasing portion of the general population. Not only is mobile the primary device,
consumers on average have multiple Internet-connected devices. The trend towards
mobile has resulted in a shift to “mobile-first” strategies for delivering information and
services in business organizations, universities, and government agencies. Though
principles for good security design exist, those principles were formulated based upon the
traditional workstation configuration instead of the mobile platform. Security design
needs to follow the shift to a “mobile-first” emphasis to ensure the usability of the
security interface.
The mobile platform has constraints on resources that can adversely impact the usability
of security. This research sought to identify design principles for usable security for
mobile devices that address the constraints of the mobile platform. Security and usability
have been seen as mutually exclusive. To accurately identify design principles, the
relationship between principles for good security design and usability design must be
understood. The constraints for the mobile environment must also be identified, and then
evaluated for their impact on the interaction of a consumer with a security interface.
To understand how the application of the proposed mobile security design principles is
perceived by users, an artifact was built to instantiate the principles. Through a series of
guided interactions, the importance of proposed design principles was measured in a
simulation, in human-computer interaction, and in user perception. The measures
showed a resounding difference between the usability of the same security design
delivered on mobile vs. workstation platform. It also reveals that acknowledging the
constraints of an environment and compensating for the constraints yields mobile security
that is both usable and secure. Finally, the hidden cost of security design choices that
distract the user from the surrounding environment were examined from both the security
perspective and public safety perspective.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1

Introduction and Problem Statement
Access to digital information is no longer reserved to an elite minority of scholars

and businesses—the Internet has put access in hands of the general public (Yang &
Zhiyong, 2010). From environmental information to e-government services to phone
directories, information delivery and interaction has shifted from print to exclusively
electronic (Kirk, Chiagouris, & Gopalakrishna, 2011). The accelerated movement of
service to e-only delivery makes technology a necessity for all instead of a non-essential
luxury item (Kim, Lee, & Menon, 2009).
Increasingly, mobile devices have moved from being companion devices of a
computer workstation (Myers, 2005) to being the primary or stand-alone device for
digital information access (West & Mace, 2009). Computer crime, already a problem on
the traditional workstation (Brenner, 2007; Lawton, 2007), has followed computer users
to the mobile platform (Salerno, Sanzgiri, & Upadhyaya, 2011). A mobile computing
platform provides challenges in security that differ from the traditional computing
workstation (Oberheide & Jahanian, 2010), and the structured work environment (Green,
2007). The challenges include designing sufficiently usable security to match the needs
and capabilities of the users of these devices.
1.2

Problem Statement and Argument
The research objective is to identify effective principles to design usable security

for mobile devices. Principles exist for achieving a good security design for information
systems (Saltzer & Schroeder, 1975), as well as for usability design of information
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systems (Shneiderman et al., 2016). These principles do not exist in a consolidated
framework, making the application of either one (Boivie, Gulliksen, & Göransson, 2006)
or both in a coordinated effort uncommon (Rehman & Mustafa, 2009). Furthermore,
these principles were developed for information systems in the context of a stationary
workstation instead of the mobile devices (Botha, Furnell, & Clarke, 2008). The two
environments are significantly different in application design capabilities as well as
hardware (Burigat, Chittaro, & Gabrielli, 2008). The design of security on the mobile
device is equally impacted by the platform and hardware of mobile devices as are other
applications (Oberheide & Jahanian, 2010). Usable security is demanded by the typical
user community of mobile devices for e-banking and other financial applications (Weir,
Douglas, Richardson, & Jack, 2010).
To effectively design these principles, attention must be paid to the effort required
of the user to follow security (Yuan, Archer, Connelly, & Zheng, 2010), appropriate
security for the value of the information (Grawemeyer & Johnson, 2011) , and the
resource constraints of the devices in terms of physical form factors (Mittal & Sengupta,
2009) and device capabilities (Shih & Wang, 2011).
The key to satisfying these needs is design that unifies both security and
usability principles (Cranor & Garfinkel, 2005). Systems designed with security
and usability principles remain more secure, because the users do not circumvent
security for functionality (Albrechtsen & Hovden, 2009).
Security is frequently an add-on (Baskerville, 1993). Usability is
similarly an add-on (Garfinkel, 2005). In both cases, the lack of integration of
security and usability into the bedrock of the design makes both less effective.
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Beyond this similar disrespect, there is a deeper relationship between security and
usability. Lack is of usability is a form of security (Sasse, Brostoff, & Weirich,
2001). The most secure system is one that never breached, but not necessarily
used. The reverse can also be true: the removal of complicated security protocols
can make a system extremely usable. System design can turn into a tug-of-war
between the two extremes, with many systems designers choosing to trade off
usability for security and vice versa (Faily & Flechais, 2010).
Closer examination of secure design principles, such as those proposed by
Saltzer and Schroeder (1975), and usability principles documented by
Shneiderman et al. (2016), may reveal a relationship between security and
usability principles. For example, a streamlined design with an efficient interface
can offer both good security and high usability, if it is possible to follow a
combined set of design principles.
Security that is designed with usability does not trigger users’ natural
aversion to systems that make them trade off functionality for security (Stanton,
Stam, Mastrangelo, & Jolton, 2005). One of the ways used to address the
aversion to confusing security measures is security awareness training (Horcher &
Tejay, 2009; Shaw, Chen, Harris, & Huang, 2009). For the non-organizational
user of mobile devices, there is no formal oversight or compensating training
(Poole, Chetty, Morgan, Grinter, & Edwards, 2009). The user depends upon an
informal network of resources of varying quality and security knowledge.
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1.3

Contribution to the Body of Knowledge – Dissertation Goal
While security and usability have been addressed, both separately and together,

the previous focus has been on conventional workstations (Oberheide & Jahanian, 2010)
or specific instances of mobile security (Weir, et al., 2010). Instead of a case by case
basis, this study proposes a series of design principles that apply across mobile devices as
a group.
Garfinkel (2005) most clearly documented the gap in the literature on secure and
usable design. Garfinkel proposed the use of design patterns for secure operations.
These patterns, such as “least surprise” and “disable by default” are almost too simple to
be respected. The common sense of using good defaults is most obvious in hindsight.
The dissertation also calls for new defaults to address the burgeoning need for combined
security and usability on mobile platforms. Patterns are a step towards understanding
security as a dimension of usability and vice versa.
1.4

The Importance of the Research Problem
Usability in information system security design reduces the effort needed to

follow secure practices, similar to how usability reduces the effort to use websites and
even items of a user’s normal environment (Norman, 2004). Users typically choose
functionality over security when security becomes a barrier to getting the job done
(Albrechtsen & Hovden, 2009); therefore, adding usability to a security design should
reduce the need to choose functionality over security (Furnell, 2008). A combined
security-usability design framework reduces the effort needed to add security, and
security designer does not choose security functionality over system usability (Whitten &
Tygar, 1999).
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1.4.1

The Challenge of Usability
Computer systems have moved outside the context of business and research

organizations to become an essential part of the home (Mazurek et al., 2010). In the
home the traditional support structure, with a dedicated Information Technology expert,
is not the norm (Poole et al., 2009). For the home user, there are no organization
resources to compensate for difficult security. Too much security and the users run the
risk of not having access to their own devices. The home user seeks informal support
through a personal network, or systems that provide a highly positive user experience
with usability, such as the Apple iPhone (Arruda-Filho, Cabusas, & Dholakia, 2010), and
need less support.
1.4.2

Dealing with More Devices per User
Mobile devices have increased the convenience of computing, and also the variety

of an individual user’s computing experience (Oulasvirta & Sumari, 2007). A typical
information worker may manipulate a laptop, a cell phone, several hard drives, and a
portable music player in the course of the work day (gAshbrook & Lyons, 2010). Each
device adds a degree of complexity with its own security mechanism and information
management structure.
The interoperability of multiple mobile devices through a network can improve
the sharing of information (Walker, Stanton, Jenkins, & Salmon, 2009). Ebook readers
such as the Amazon Kindle and the Barnes & Noble Nook have used this interoperability
to move content seamlessly between platforms and increase user acceptance through
usability (Horcher & Cohen, 2011). Though ebooks and ebook readers had been
available for over a decade, surmounting the content acquisition barrier with a common
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repository in the cloud, and a non-intrusive authentication mechanism made the media
and devices accessible to a wider community. Applying consistent usability-security
could induce the same user satisfaction and acceptance of security on the multiple mobile
devices.
1.4.3

More Sensitive Information on Mobile
Mobile devices have become so multi-functional that access controls are needed

to protect the users’ information on the device, and provide secure authentication to the
systems interfaced to by the device (Pasquinucci, 2009). To provide the ease of use
needed for user adoption, these controls must take into account the in-motion
environment where the device will be used (Barnard, Yi, Jacko, & Sears, 2005, 2007;
Chang, 2010) and the form factors of the mobile device (Chang, 2010). Instead of simply
transferring methods designed for the form factors of a standard-sized keyboard and
screen, the security methods need to optimize and exploit the capabilities of the device
(Botha et al., 2008).
The current authentication mechanisms such as the PIN or complex passwords,
which are exponentially more difficult to input on the mobile keyboard, generate
increased user pushback and induce the typical trade-off between functionality and
security (Furnell, Clarke, & Karatzouni, 2008). Since the portability of the device makes
loss more probable, plus the increasing value of the information stored on mobile devices
and the increasing dependence of users on their mobile devices, the loss or compromise
of mobile devices has financial, reputation, and emotional repercussions (Chen & Katz,
2009).
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The mismatch of traditional security procedures with mobile capabilities is typical
of design that is not centered on the human element. Understanding how humans interact
with the device in an anthropometric context, which includes hand size, dexterity, and
gender (Bylund & Burström, 2006), and situational context (e.g., in-motion, while
performing other device activities) is key to determining which current authentication
methods are optimal for mobile devices and what human-centered design elements affect
securing mechanisms (Hwang, Cho, & Park, 2008).
In addition to the proliferation of computing devices, the resource-constraints of
mobile devices have further complicated the design of both security and usability. Unlike
desktop workstations, every micrometer of internal space, every inch of screen real
estate, and every amp of power is at a premium (Rahmati & Zhong, 2009).
1.5

Scope and Definitions of Terms
The following terms are used for this study.


Information Security: A well-informed sense of assurance that information risks
and controls are in balance (Anderson, 2003). Risks are based on the context of
the information. What is secure in a small organization may not be in a large
organization. Keeping the controls in balance speaks to the trade-off between
security and accessibility. The “well-informed sense” requires the
implementation of controls using a deep understanding of the goals of the
organization or situation being protected.



Information System: All information handling activities at the technical, formal
and informal levels of an organization (Liebenau & Backhouse, 1990). Formal
levels of an organization are marked by regulation and explicit consequences.
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Information handling done by imitation or unconscious observation is at an
informal level. Explicit transfer of information from teacher to student is typical
of technical information handling.


Mobile Devices: mobile devices refers to hand-held cellular communication
devices. These devices primarily consist of smart phones and tablets. Mobile
devices not included are laptop computers, portable hard drives, USB thumb
drives, and portable music players (Hosmer et al., 2011).



Usability: the extent to which a product can be used by specified users to achieve
specified goals with effectiveness, efficiency, and satisfaction in a specified
context of use (Jokela, Iivari, Matero, & Karukka, 2003).



Security-usability (or usable security): usability that relates specifically to the
security interface (Cranor and Garfinkel, 2005).

1.6

Research Questions
This study has two specific research questions that seek to address how to better

design usable security for mobile devices. The first research question is:
Research Question 1 – How does the overlap or conflict between security and usability
impact the design of effective usable security on mobile devices?
Design principles for usability are well-known within the HCI community. Security
design principles are lesser known both within the HCI community and the security
community. Even less acknowledged is the difference between usability of the security
component of a system or device, and the usability of primary components of the system
or device.
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Another concern is whether it is possible to apply a new set of design principles in
an effective way; therefore, the second research question is:
Research Question 2 – Will a set of design principles structured to conserve constrained
resource attain security usability?
Approaching this question creates a need to define meaningful measures of usability and
security.
1.7

Structure of the Dissertation
This dissertation is organized into five main chapters: introduction, literature

review, research methodology, results and discussion. The introduction is the first
chapter of this dissertation and provides an introduction to the proposed study. Topics
addressed in the introduction include why usability and security should be researched as a
combination and why the mobile platform is of significance. Next, the research problem
is presented along with the underlying argument, its relevancy and its significance for
research. The research questions are then presented and discussed along with how the
research questions support the research problem. A brief set of definitions follows.
Finally a review of the overall structure of this dissertation is presented.
The next chapter of the dissertation reviews the research literature that is relevant
to usability and security. First previous work in security design is reviewed. Then
usability research related to form factors is discussed. The difference between mobile vs.
fixed computing environments in terms of security design is discussed, followed a
summary of user behavior research related to security and functionality.
The review of literature chapter then discusses what is known about human
computer interfaces on mobile devices, security and mobile devices, and the gaps in the
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extant literature. Once the gaps are clearly identified then the significant contributions
this research makes to the existing body of knowledge is presented. This chapter
concludes with a brief summary.
The next chapter of the dissertation presents the research methodology and
theoretical basis for the study. The research methodology begins with an overview of
design science research as it was originally conceived (Hevner, March, Park, & Ram,
2004) and how design science research has been applied in recent studies (Venable,
2010). A high level view of the research method is outlined with the steps required to
accomplish the research study.
The fourth chapter of the dissertation presents the results of the study. The
demographic information about participants is covered. The results section is divided
into the three phases that were described in the methodology, with the hypotheses that
were evaluated in each individual phase linked to their results.
The final chapter discusses the meaning of the results, the importance of the
results, and the contribution to the literature. Future research suggested by the results is
also discussed.
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2.

Chapter 2
Chapter 2

Review of the Literature
The review of literature is comprised of four sections that provides the theoretical
basis for this study. The first section reviews the current state of security design and best
practices. The next section reviews the current research in human computer interfaces
(HCI). The third section reviews the differences and challenges in developing for the
mobile platform, particularly in the area of resource conservation. Finally, the fourth
identifies the gap in the literature that this study attempts to address.
2.1

Security Design
The need for new security techniques to address the brave new reality of mobile

and pervasive computing has several root causes (Oberheide & Jahanian, 2010). In some
cases the lessons learned from desktop security are just as valid for the mobile platforms.
In others the new platform has challenges due to resource constraints that make a classic
technique inappropriate.
After a series of studies in the early nineties Baskerville (1993) proclaimed human
error was the greatest problem in security. These studies also show the reluctance of
companies and individual users to reveal mistakes that caused security breaches. The
evidence continues to suggest that humans are not getting smarter about computers and
security (Flechais & Sasse, 2009). Designing for this weakest link in the security
structure yields a better result than training the human to exhibit less usable behavior
(Ng, Kankanhalli, & Xu, 2009; Sasse et al., 2001). Using a checklist can predict
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vulnerabilities in systems (Farahmand, Navathe, Enslow, & Sharp, 2003), but usability
can pre-dispose a system to have less incidents.
Modeling languages to represent security requirements have been proposed to
streamline the design process (Hatebur, Heisel, Jorjens, & Schmidt, 2011). Giving
designers a language to express security design concepts improves communication in the
design process. Another approach is to create security monitoring devices that are more
usable (Davies & Tryfonas, 2009). Instead of requiring the security practitioner to
engineer the scan through a series of command line prompts, the interface presents in a
web browser with full-screen output.
2.2

Human Computer Interface (HCI) for Mobile Devices
Waves of new technology bring an accompanying amnesia of human-centered

design principles. Human-centered design, instead of technology-centered design, will
produce devices that will be accepted, effective, and even loved by the owner, because
they satisfy a functional need and elicit an emotional response (Norman, 2004). Mobile
and wearable devices have become a part of everyday life to the point where an
individual is emotionally dependent on the device (Chen & Katz, 2009), and financially
dependent on the security of the device (Hwang et al., 2008).
Acceptance and usability of mobile/wearable devices depends on design based on
user requirements accurately reflecting human interaction with the device, even where the
population is not homogeneous. Gender, age, and capability differences drive how
humans interact with devices, including mobile and wearable devices (Schwanen, Kwan,
& Ren, 2008). “One size fits all” is particularly ineffectual in biometric-based
applications (Hunter, 2004). Similarly, requirements for mobile and wearable need to
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reflect physical and particularly biometric differences where those differences affect key
design components.
2.2.1

HCI and mobile device usage
Current research on mobile device design is centered on the functionality of the

internals of the mobile device, as opposed to the form factors of the external device.
College students are a mobile population with high dependency on their mobile devices
(Chen & Katz, 2009). Mobile devices provide direct and private communication that is
easily available because the device is carried on their person. Similarly, the features that
college students prize in their mobile devices extend past communication to auxiliary
activities like email, music players, organization and reminder activities, and even style
(Economides & Grousopoulou, 2009). The trend continues to evolve toward combining
individual electronic devices into one multi-functional device that retains a compact
footprint.
College students show some gender differences on mobile device usage. In
particular, the female respondents were less concerned about price (Economides &
Grousopoulou, 2009). The buying power of women is a significant factor in the
economy, as women have become the largest growing market of consumers. Designing
products that appeal to women’s need to simplify, or reclaim time, is an economic
advantage (Silverstein, Sayre, & Butman, 2009).
Similarly, the functionality requirements of the mobile professional have been
assessed (Gebauer, 2008). The functionality of mobile devices, even with usability
issues, was preferred over the non-mobile counterpart. Using the task technology fit
(TTF) theory, Gebauer (2008) mapped the task to its non-mobile equivalent to measure
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how well the device performed. The results actually showed a mutation of the task when
in the mobile environment, with the users performing the tasks for different reasons, and
in a different manner. The form factors of weight and size, which are not the focus of the
TTF theory, play a prominent role in the success and user acceptance of the device.
The need for specialized versions of tools in the mobile environment also creates
a disparity with the non-mobile equivalent (Economou, Gavalas, Kenteris, & Tsekouras,
2008). The authoring tools of the non-mobile platform need special versions to be able to
create applications at all, and in particular ones that suit the smaller keyboard, lower
processing speed and limited storage of the mobile device. In some ways it is the
equivalent of returning to the early days of computing when every byte of storage was
rationed, and every computing cycle was optimized to use the least amount of processing.
Tourist information, mapping, and global positioning satellite (GPS) applications
(Kenteris, Gavalas, & Economou, 2009) are capabilities most needed by uses who uses
the mobile device to navigate in real time, while acquiring new information about the
surrounding environment. The concept of the mobile web browser was originally
proposed for the Apple Newton PDA in 1995 (Gessler & Kotulla, 1995). Looking at the
design objectives, or requirements for the future device based on that more primitive
device, shows the value of abstracting the design objectives for future re-use.
Besides navigational information, the mobile professional also has an evolving
need to be able to tap into personal information repositories when on the move (Karypidis
& Lalis, 2007), without acquiring the overhead of synchronization and file management.
The Omnistore software is one of the solutions proposed to handle this challenge, as
mobile professionals continue to create a personal area network with information moving
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between laptops, desktops, and small form factor mobile devices (Karypidis & Lalis,
2007). Research on mobile devices also has included the head-mounted devices (HMD),
as well as laptop and PDA combinations (Serif & Ghinea, 2008). The research had
participants performing real-life tasks in “realistic scenarios,” but not actually as part of
daily life. The environment was pre-configured to have Wi-Fi blankets readily available
as opposed to the current norm of isolated Wi-Fi hotspots.
Beyond the actual applications, the mobile device presents challenges for
readability, which is linked both to physical screen size, and processing power
deliverable in a the compact format (Dennler et al., 2007). Larger screen sizes and more
processing create a greater drain on battery power, particularly conventional lithium-ion
battery power (Min, Cha, & Ha, 2009). The development of solar fuel cells have the twin
advantages of reducing the weight of the device because they are thinner, and improving
the battery life by the recharging in the mobile environment from a widely available
energy source (Dennler, et al., 2007). Oquist and Goldstein (2003) used readability
formula rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) to propose an alternate presentation of
text on the screen to improve readability. Instead of the eye moving across the screen, the
text appears in discernible chunks anticipating the readers’ consumption rate. Movement
of the eye is a factor in balance, which is particularly relevant to mobile devices being
used while in motion (Barnard, et al., 2005).
2.1.2. HCI and Gender Differences
In the human-computer interaction studies of mobile devices, the focus has been
specific functionalities such as hand positions (Wobbrock, Myers, & Aung, 2008).
However, gender differences are frequently noted in the studies, as in preferences of
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older women for haptic and older men for tactile interface (Kurniawan, 2008). With the
current devices so heavily based on manual interaction, the gender differences in
physicality become significant.
Gender differences in hand shape and strength affect the performance of manual
tasks (Bylund & Burström, 2006; Clerke, Clerke, & Adams, 2005; Crosby & Wehbé,
1994; Talsania & Kozin, 1998). Even in a pre-pubertal population, handgrip strength was
predictable along gender lines (Jürimäe, Hurbo, & Jürimäe, 2009), showing boys and
girls of similar ages and height still differed significantly in forearm strength. In addition
to hand strength and shape, the predilection to carpal tunnel, osteoarthritis and other
medically handicapping conditions also shows a gender difference (Boz, Ozmenoglu,
Altunayoglu, Velioglu, & Alioglu, 2004; Xu et al., 1998), where the hand strength
anthropometric norm of females became a risk factor for developing carpal tunnel
syndrome (CTS) and osteoarthritis.
Beyond gender differences in body parts, there are also differences in how men
and women interact with mobile devices due to gender norms in processing visual
information (Kimchi, Amishav, & Sulitzeanu-Kenan, 2009). As information is presented
on a small screen in a compact format, optimizing the perception of the mobile user either
by device physical design, or software design pays off in user satisfaction.
The pattern of Internet-connected activities also shows gender differences (Ren &
Kwan, 2009), with women performing a much higher percentage of maintenance-related
tasks, over leisure tasks as compared to men. In addition, the locale of everyday
activities varies between the genders (Schwanen et al., 2008). Women traditionally have
a higher responsibility for household and care giving, and their time available for

17
Internet-connected tasks is fragmented. Not being tied to a primary location, such as the
home, provides both freedom and risk. The maintenance tasks can be performed while in
transit, or waiting for another activity to commence. In addition, mobile devices must
have sufficient security, as in the firewall protection typical of the home network when
the devices are being used to transmit and manipulate highly private information of
household finance manipulation.
The mounting evidence of gender differences points to a need for flexible
interfaces that can be tailored to specific physicality of the user (Rode, 2011). The “one
size fits all” design that lacks the ability for adjustment leads to HCI with one size that
fits none well.
2.3

Mobile Platforms and Security
Mobile devices are becoming the technology platform of choice for most people

to interact with throughout their day (Saha & Mukherjee, 2003). More than just a phone,
a mobile device can be an emotional and medical lifeline (Chen & Katz, 2009; Osmani,
Balasubramaniam, & Botvich, 2008). With more and more information moving to the
cloud, the connectivity of the device is as important as the on-board capabilities (Buyya,
Yeo, Venugopal, Broberg, & Brandic, 2009). Along with connectivity, the security
capabilities of the device must protect the information being transmitted to guard an
individual's privacy (Price, Adam, & Nuseibeh, 2005) and to guard against misuse by
cyber-criminals (Oberheide & Jahanian, 2010).
The nature of the mobile device provides new technology challenges for
providing security, and new constraints (Mancini et al., 2009). The physical form factor
of mobile devices that makes them lightweight and convenient to carry also limits the
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size of the screen, and the size of the processor that can be put into the device. The need
for portability constrains the size of the battery to power the device, and requires the
battery last as long as possible (Rahmati & Zhong, 2009). Therefore, the processes on
mobile devices must be designed to use the lesser computing power of a smaller
processor and conserve the power used.
Along with the constraints, mobile devices typically come with additional
capabilities such as global positioning systems (GPS), motion detectors (accelerometers),
and voice input. This new norm of technology provides new possibilities for interacting
with the devices (Bayir, Demirbas, & Eagle, 2010).
2.4

Addressing the Gap in Current Research
Though usability design principles have been extensively discusses for the

workstation platform, these principles focus on the workstation platform (Shneiderman et
al., 2016). The differences in workstation and mobile platforms impacts the
effectiveness of workstation-based design principles when transferred to the mobile
platform (Oberheide & Jahanian, 2010), particularly in area of security because security
is not the primary objective of the user (Gebauer, Kline, & He, 2011), and resources are
constrained on the mobile platform. Design principles that reflect the reality of mobile
devices are needed for effective usable security for mobile devices.
2.5

Summary of Literature Survey
Looking across at the literature domains of security design reveals an emphasis on

complexity for security strength even while the literature on user behavior indicates
complexity alone fails. Human error is documented as the consistent weakest link in any
security system, yet eliminating human error by design is still not the greatest emphasis
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in security. The difficulty of studying human behavior related is compounded by
reluctance of companies and individuals to participate in security studies for fear of
revealing too much truth about their behavior and creating a security vulnerability.
The HCI literature reveals that the size of screen and the manipulation of mobile
interfaces create challenges in design. Differences in ability to manipulate the device
based on gender and age are magnified by the smaller margin of error caused by the
device size. Finally because mobile devices are not fixed in position, mobile security
presents additional design challenges to achieve usable security.
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3.

Chapter 3

Chapter 3
Research Methodology
Typically, application designers for information systems are domain experts in the
primary functionality of the application, rather than security or usability (Pfleeger &
Pfleeger, 2009). Design principles that guide the domain expert designer to best practices
for usability and security enhance the integration of security and usability into
information systems (Garfinkel, 2005). In this section, the principles for good security
design and high usability, as defined in the literature, are examined for overlap and
conflict. A combined framework of security-usability principles is presented as a result
of mapping security and usability design principles together. Next, resources available on
mobile devices are examined for possible impact on security-usability. Constrained
resources specific to the mobile platform are identified, as well as the combined securityusability design principles that address conservation of those resources.
The resulting combined security-usability design principles are evaluated using a
design science research (DSR) approach. An artifact consisting of a mobile application
with a security interface is created by applying the new security-usability design
principles. To determine how well the design of the artifact refutes or supports the
hypotheses, three phases of evaluation were done. The first set of measures scores the
complexity of the security interface a predictive modeling tool. The second set of
measures uses an experiment where the usage of the artifact is tracked as it conserves
resources on the mobile platform. The third set of measures uses a standardized usability
survey to measure user satisfaction with the artifact.
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Design science research solves problems in a more effective and efficient manner
by creating an artifact to represent the proposed solution (Hevner, March, Park, & Ram,
2004). Because of the nature of many design-research problems, an optimal solution may
not always be possible (Simon, 1996). A designer instead searches through available
alternatives until an acceptable alternative, or satisficing is found. Choosing the design
science approach is also supported by the security-usability design principles developed
for the desktop by Garfinkel (2005). Garfinkel advocated “Good Security Now,” which
requires designers to search through the available solutions for the best fit at a particular
point in time.
3.1

Security and Usability Design Principles Frameworks
Usability in design reduces the effort needed to use the system properly from both

a physical and cognitive perspective (Shneiderman et al., 2016). When security becomes
a barrier to getting the job done, users typically choose functionality over security
(Albrechtsen & Hovden, 2009). Adding usability to a security design should alleviate the
need to choose functionality over security (Furnell, 2008). A combined security-usability
design framework reduces the effort needed to add security, which means the security
designer feels less pressure to choose security functionality over system usability
(Whitten & Tygar, 1999).
When designing computer security, it is important to understand what security
means. Most secure design focuses on confidentiality and integrity at the expense of
availability (Aiello & Ruffo, 2012). Availability makes a security asset available to the
appropriate people at the appropriate times. Another way to say this is to make a security
asset “usable.”
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To articulate the concept of secure design Saltzer and Schroeder (1975) created
nine principles. These principles, seen in Table 1, further specify what makes a system
secure. At least half of the secure design principles relate directly to the interface with
the user as shown in the table. As a result, “good” security design created according to
these principles already includes recommendations about the interface. The “protection”
and “restriction” categories contain principles that describe the functionality that should
be present to ensure a secure design.
Table 1. Security Design Principles by Functionality (Saltzer & Kaashoek, 2009)
Functionality Principle and Description

Interface

Psychological Acceptability
Whether the user is favorably disposed
Complete Mediation
Handle all interaction to completion
Least Common Mechanism
Avoid combining multiple security objectives into the same interface.
(Similar to modular code.)
Economy of Mechanism
Simple but elegant design
Failing Secure
Security error does not create a security breach

Protection

Reluctance to Trust
Access to information, like power, corrupts.
Never Assume that Your Secrets are Safe
Even the best security can fail

Restriction

Principle of Least Privilege
Give the user only the right access
Separation of Privilege/duty
Checks and balances to avoid too much power for one user
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Similar to the security principles created by Saltzer and Schroeder (1975), the
usability practitioners have the two seminal sets of heuristics or principles for design.
The Golden Eight from Shneiderman et al. (2016) and ten more from Nielsen (1990)
form the core of usability design. These two sets of principles have very similar
statements on how to design with usability, as shown in Table 2.
Table 2. Usability Principles
Usability Principles I Shneiderman’s
Eight (Shneiderman, et al., 2016)

Usability Principles II
Nielsen’s Ten Usability Heuristics
(Nielsen & Tahir, 2001)

Internal locus of control

User control and freedom

Shortcuts for experience

Flexibility and efficiency of use

Easy reversal of actions

Match between system and the real world

Dialog to Closure

Visibility of system status

Informative Feedback

Error prevention
Help and documentation

Consistency

Consistency and standards

Reduce short-term memory load

Recognition rather than recall
Aesthetic and minimalist design

Simple Error Handling

Help users recognize, diagnose, and
recover from errors

These two sets of usability principles have been the cornerstone of usability
research for over two decades. In addition to these usability principles, Shneiderman coinvented the Nassi-Shneiderman chart technique to represent structured programming
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(Dykstra-Erickson, 2000; Nassi & Shneiderman, 1973). Similar to the usability research,
the Nassi-Shneiderman structure charting techniques make the drawing of the flow of a
structured program more usable than previous techniques.
Table 3. Comparing Security Design Principles to Usability Design Principles

Security Principles
(Saltzer & Schroeder,
1975)

Eight Usability
Principles
(Shneiderman, et al.,
2016)

Ten Heuristics for Usability
Design
(Nielsen, 1990)

Psychological
Acceptability

Internal locus of control

User control and freedom

Shortcuts for experience

Flexibility and efficiency of
use

Easy reversal of actions

Match between system and the
real world

Dialog to Closure

Visibility of system status

Informative Feedback

Error prevention

Complete Mediation

Help and documentation

Least Common Mechanism

Consistency

Consistency and standards

Economy of Mechanism

Reduce short-term
memory load

Recognition rather than recall
Aesthetic and minimalist
design

Failing Secure

Simple Error Handling

Help users recognize, diagnose,
and recover from errors
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Nielsen’s seminal usability principles are still used as the basis of usability testing
for the latest technology including mobile devices such as the Amazon Fire tablet
(Nielsen, 2011). Resolution of the perceived conflict between security and usability
requirements in software design has led to the development of frameworks that weigh
either one or the other concept as a priority (Mairiza & Zowghi, 2010). The existence of
this security-usability conflict is an ongoing theme in software design (Ben-Asher,
Meyer, Moller, & Englert, 2009; Ka-Ping, 2004; Turpe, 2008).
Mapping Shneiderman et al.’s (2016) eight usability principles and Nielsen’s
(1990) ten heuristics for user interface design to Saltzer and Schroeder’s (1975) security
design principles as shown in Table 3, yields an interesting result. Usability principles
are not in conflict with secure design principles. The chart shows each principle in the
category “interface” for security parallels a usability principle or principles stated for the
same concept in both Shneiderman’s usability principles and Nielsen’s ten heuristics for
user interface design.
Psychological acceptability can be improved by designing a system according to
user’s mental map of how the system should work, and their capabilities (Bishop, 2005).
Security and usability are often labeled non-functional requirement (NFR) and, therefore,
a less critical part of the software design due to security-usability illiteracy of the
designer. A combined design framework reduces the effort needed by a non-expert to
add security-usability.
3.1.1

Combining Security and Usability
In spite of scarcity of usability in security designs (Cranor & Garfinkel, 2005), the

mapping shows that usability design principles are essentially a subset of good security
design principles (Table 4). Garfinkel (2005) also included usability issues caused by
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Table 4. Consolidated Principles of Security and Usability Design
Security
Principles
(Saltzer &
Schroeder, 1975)

Usability
Principles I
(Shneiderman,
et al., 2016)

Usability
Principles II
(Nielsen, 1990)

Psychological
Acceptability

Internal locus of
control
Shortcuts for
experience
Easy reversal of
actions

User control and
freedom
Flexibility and
efficiency of use
Match system to
the real world

Dialog to
Closure

Visibility of
system status
Error prevention
Help
documentation

Consistent Meaningful
Vocabulary

Complete
Mediation

Informative
Feedback

Usability & Security
(Garfinkel, 2005)

Least Surprise

Least Common
Mechanism

Consistency

Consistency and
standards

Consistent Controls

Economy of
Mechanism

Reduce shortterm memory
load

Recognition over
recall
Aesthetic and
minimalist design

No External Burden

Failing Secure

Simple Error
Handling

Help users
recognize,
diagnose, and
recover from
errors

Provide Standard
Security Policies

Reluctance to
Trust*, Promote
Not mentioned
Not mentioned
Privacy* , Never
Assume Secrets
are Safe*
Least Privilege*
Separation of
Privilege/duty*
Note. *security principles not related to usability

Good Security Now*
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non-users of the system (Table 4). In particular the principle “no external burden”
advocates designs that do not force the user to inconvenience non-users to achieve
security. Burdening a non-user who does not use the system directly, and who derives no
benefit creates a high level of push-back.
In articulating these design principles, Garfinkel (2005) made a more usable
framework by reducing the number from ten (Nielsen, 1990) and eight (Shneiderman et
al., 2016) to six. To further reduce the analysis effort of the novice designer, Garfinkel
suggested the use of design patterns to exploit the natural affinity humans have for
patterns (Schmidt, Fayad, & Johnson, 1996). Creating usability and security solutions
from a good model saves time and improves quality (Howarth, Smith-Jackson, &
Hartson, 2009).
Garfinkel (2005) proposed usability-security design patterns for resolving
suggested the use of design patterns to exploit the natural affinity humans have for
patterns (Schmidt, Fayad, & Johnson, 1996). Creating usability and security solutions
from a good model saves time and improves quality (Howarth, Smith-Jackson, &
Hartson, 2009) and resolves common issues related to authentication, deletion of files,
and management of encryption keys. Howarth, Smith-Jackson, and Hartson (2009) used
a similar approach to improve the results of novice usability researchers by creating tools
to resolve the typical data collection and management issues. Design patterns are also
being advocated for mobile device interface (Nielsen, 1990) to address the limitations of
the small screen form factor (Churchill & Hedberg, 2008).
3.1.2

Transitioning to Mobile
Translating security-usability principles to mobile security design patterns goes

beyond ticking off items on a checklist. The current security-usability framework does
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not address the resource constraints upon mobile devices. Addressing the constraints
yields principles more relevant to the mobile device platform. Certain principles may
have more impact than others based on the user effort required to use the system if the
principle is violated. Quantifying the impact of each principle on usability makes it
possible to measure system usability. It also provides designers with a means of
prioritizing which principles have the most impact.
Simply transferring security practices from desktop to mobile has not yielded
satisfactory usability and user acceptance (Oberheide & Jahanian, 2010). In spite of this,
Oberheide and Jahanian (2010) cautioned against throwing out all proven security
practices. Instead they advocate an open-minded approach that keeps what works.
Ignoring certain security-usability principles in the traditional workstation
environment of a business or research organization has minor consequences (Botha,
Furnell, & Clarke, 2008). In risk management assessment of an information system, the
vulnerabilities are weighed against the probability of the occurrence, and the loss
potentially incurred from the occurrence (Azer, El-Kassas, & El-Soudani, 2009). Ignoring
the resource constraints of the mobile device increases the probability of vulnerability
because the practical functionality of device is compromised.

Figure 1. Resource Constraints on Mobile Devices
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3.1.3

Design to Alleviate Resource Constraints
The three major resource constraints of the mobile device platform are power,

form factors, and user expertise (Figure 1). To be mobile, the devices must run from a
portable and renewable power source, such as a battery (Economides & Grousopoulou,
2009). The battery life is an important measure of user satisfaction. Security design that
accelerates the drain of battery life reduces the usability of the device.
To be mobile the devices must be small enough and light enough to carry easily
(Haverila, 2011). The screens must be big enough to use but small enough to fit in
pocket or purse (Churchill & Hedberg, 2008). In addition the devices are manipulated for
information gathering in a variety of settings, often while away from a formal
workstation (McGibbon, Hosmer, Jeffcoat, & Davis, 2011).
In the absence of a formal organization to compensate for individual user
deficiencies, the applications themselves must have reduced complexity (Churchill &
Hedberg, 2008). This paper proposes a security-usability framework that prioritizes
conserving the resources limited by the physical nature of the device and the expertise of
the user. Usable security on the mobile device requires this resource conservation
perspective over the organizational bias of previous design principles.
Revisiting the security-usability framework, seen in Figure 2, reveals five of the
consolidated principles specifically address conservation of resources, which is clearly
indicated by the words “Least” and “Economy.” Principles that relate to organizational
objectives such as separation of power and reluctance to trust are not as relevant to the
single-user mobile device, or the non-organization-based mobile device, such as a tablet

30
shared by a family. As shown in Figure 2, certain principles align to the critical resource
constraints of mobile devices.

Figure 2. Design Principles Related to Resources
“Economy of Mechanism” relates to all three areas of resource constraint. The
result of mapping resource constraints to the design principles is a framework that
prioritizes conservation of resources, as seen in Table 5. This framework can be used as
a starting point to create measures that quantify the energy and effort expended by the
user, and by the system.
The concept of simplification for good security design is also supported by the
most recent work from security pioneer Jerome Saltzer. The difficulty of maintaining
security on a complex group of systems with competing security protocols led to the
proposal of “Minimize secrets” as an additional security principle (Saltzer & Kaashoek,
2009; Smith, 2012). Every secret increases a system’s administrative burden. In the case
of self-managed security like a mobile device, the burden falls upon the user.
Consequently, user effort has already been confirmed as a constrained resource.
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Table 5. Proposed Security-Usability Principles for Resource-Constrained Devices
Security Principle

Least Surprise

Usability Principle Manifestation

User in control (flexibility and reversibility)
Shortcuts for experience
Match between system and real world

Complete Mediation

Visibility of system status
Dialog to closure
Informative Consistent Feedback
Error prevention and Help

Least Common
Mechanism

Consistency and standards in security policy
Consistency and standards in placement of information
(look-and-feel)

Economy of
Mechanism

Reduce cognitive load
Recognition rather than recall
Aesthetic and minimalist design

Principle of Least
Privilege

Good Security Now
Limit Functionality/Access to Reduce Complexity

3.2

Design Science Research Methodology
To validate the combined security-usability principles for mobile devices

proposed in the previous section, this study uses design science research (DSR)
methodology. Design research (DR) is research into or about design. DSR is research
using design as a research method or technique (Hevner et al., 2004). DSR methodology
has a series of steps that result in specific outputs (Figure 3). It can be an iterative
process, as information from an evaluation influences the design of another element
(Vaishnavi & Kuechler, 2004).
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Figure 3. Steps in DSR Methodology (Hevner et al., 2004)

3.2.1

Awareness of Problem: Design Principles Needed for Mobile Devices
As discussed in 3.1.2, Transitioning to Mobile, the design principles for security-

usability have not effectively transferred from workstation to mobile. The proposed
security-usability principles address the issues that are at the heart of the incompatibility.
An artifact that is designed with these principles should demonstrate a higher level of
security-usability.
In applying the design principles to increase the security-usability, the artifact
should mitigate the normal resistance behavior of users to security (Virginia Tech, 2011).
Security is not the main goal of the user, and security challenge is seen as an interruption
of progress toward the desired task (Pfleeger & Caputo, 2012). For example, a mobile
user does not unlock a phone because they want to use the unlocking mechanism; they
unlock the phone to answer it. The interruption of a task makes the primary task take
longer to complete and lowers the quality of the result (Lenox, Pilarski, Leathers, &
2012). Unusable security can prove so repulsive to a user that the user may make the
choice to stop using the device to avoid the experience (Theofanos & Pfleeger, 2011).
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In the mobile environment where users primarily manage their devices outside the
confines of an organization, the effect of resistance to security is not mitigated by formal
policies, or security awareness training (Barkhuus & Polichar, 2011). Neither is there an
information technology department to support the user in resolving security interface
issues. As discussed in Chapter 2, this puts a greater burden on the user to gain the
expertise to navigate less usable security interfaces.
The most common security interface for Internet sites uses password and user
identifier authentication, also known as basic authentication (Chiasson, Forget, Stobert,
Oorschot, & Biddle, 2009). The manner in which basic authentication is currently
encountered by mobile device users creates a situation where failure is not only common,
but inevitable. The average user has 25 or more user identifier (userid) and password
combinations to manage (Gao, Ma, Jia, & Ye, 2012). In most cases the user is expected
to recall the passwords and userids from memory. Though users are encouraged to use
unique passwords for each account (Florencio & Herley, 2007), four to five is the number
of unrelated, regularly used passwords that users can be expected to successfully
manipulate (Adams & Sasse, 1999).
Because most people find it difficult to remember alphanumeric passwords
(Florencio & Herley, 2007), they adopt various strategies, usually unsafe, to manage
them (Everitt, Bragin, Fogarty, & Kohno, 2009). The gap between passwords to manage,
and the number that can be remembered dooms the effort to failure if the user relies upon
the normal capabilities of human memory recall (Horcher & Tejay, 2009). As a result,
the accumulation of more accounts normally means the reuse of more passwords, not the
creation of new ones (Gaw & Felten, 2006).
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Using graphical passwords to enhance memorability does not negate the difficulty
of multiple password recall (Biddle, Chiasson, & Oorschot, 2012). Furthermore, the user
may have difficulty in recalling the user identifier (UID), which is relatively public
(Florencio, Herley, & Coskun, 2007), as well as the password. The quantity of
passwords hampers recall regardless of the format. On the other hand, passwords cannot
be abandoned until an alternate method of authentication which is usable and secure is
developed (Stajano, 2011). As stated previously, Garfinkel’s security-usability design
principle of “Good Security Now,” advises system designers to design the best security
possible with the current capabilities instead of waiting for some future discovery to
solve all the issues (Garfinkel, 2005). Password safe software to store groups of
passwords securely behind a single key (Lee & Ewe, 2007) or external password storage
in a hardware token such as Pico (Stajano, 2011) are options for managing multiple
passwords. Using a paper notebook to organize the insecure practice of writing (Roberts,
2010) can be better from the user perspective than being denied access to accounts.
3.2.2

Suggested Solution: Cued-recall Location-based User Entry (CLUE)
The artifact used to instantiate the proposed security-usability principles, a

security navigation interface, provides an alternative to current navigation of basic
authentication. Rather than the pure recall required by typical UID-password
authentication, the user is assisted with cued-recall, also known as hints. The hints are
delivered based on the concept of progressive authentication, which seeks to reduce the
authentication overhead on mobile devices (Riva, Qin, Strauss, & Lymberopoulos, 2012).
During Riva’s evaluation of a prototype of progressive authentication the users were
allowed to trade off convenience against stronger protection based on an assignment of
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risk. When using content at lower risk, less frequent authentication was required from
the user.
In this case the amount of assistance, or cued-recall location-based user entry
(CLUE), is higher in safe locations and lower in less safe locations. The design uses the
capabilities and intrinsic qualities of mobile, such as GPS, to implement progressive
security based on location.
Risk assessment of the use of technology shows locations are not equal in security
risk. Internet Protocol (IP) addresses of a device are used as a means to identify risk (H.
Park & Redford, 2007). By definition a mobile device is one that can change location
(Barkhuus & Polichar, 2011), so the GPS address is a better indicator of the location and
the potential risk of the location. When in the locations that have reduced risk, less risk
should require less security. Less security, in turn, should require less consumption of
resources. Varying the security based on location should appropriately conserve
constrained resources.
Authentication schemes are based on what a user knows, what a user has, and/or
what a user is (Almuairfi, Veeraraghavan, & Chilamkurti, 2012). The artifact stores
password hints and user identifiers instead of the passwords. When the actual password is
not stored, the user must still bring something they know to authenticate. The user must
decode the hint into a password. Using cued recall to perform the memory task of
password retrieval allows previously inaccessible information in a pure recall situation to
be retrieved with a retrieval clue (Stobert & Biddle, 2013). The effort of cued-recall is
lower than pure recall (Biddle, Chiasson, & Oorschot, 2012). Therefore the appropriate
use of cued-recall conserves one of the constrained resources identified for mobile
devices, user expertise/effort, and applies the proposed security-usability principles.
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3.2.3

Adjust Security Based on Risk to Conserve Constrained Resources

The Microsoft security threat model is one of the most simple, and applicable to
characteristics of software (Steer & Popli, 2008). As seen in Figure 4, the assessment
begins with an examination of the objectives of the software. The objectives of CLUE
are to conserve the constrained resources on mobile devices. If the risk varies based on
location, then the expenditure of resources to compensate for that risk could also vary.
For example, within the home, a user may not need to have a frequent phone lockout
because the risk of compromise in that location is lower.

Figure 4. Microsoft Security Threat Model.
Each location where a mobile device uses the CLUE interface is put in category
that represents the probable risk at that location. The categories are described in Figure 5,
and the resulting security behavior from the CLUE interfaces.
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Figure 5. Location Security Categories and Behaviors
The high risk setting of CLUE behaves like conventional security available on
mobile devices and desktop workstations. The user receives no assistance from the
CLUE interface, other than a shortcut to the URL of the Internet site being visited. The
functionality resembles bookmarks functionality present in most browsers, and has the
same risk. Locations by default are public and considered high risk.
The medium risk setting of the CLUE interface provides a link to the desired Internet
site, and the user identifier (UID) for that site. A work location is typically medium risk
because physical access is frequently controlled.
The low risk setting of the CLUE interface provides a link to the desired Internet
site, the UID, and a password hint. The hint is not displayed until the user requests it.
The user’s home location is typically low risk, because there is very limited access to the
location, and the access is by persons trusted by the user.
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As a result of providing variable security for variable risk (Figure 5), the CLUE
interface conserves the constrained resources of power, form factors, and user effort in a
mobile security interface. Use of the CLUE interface in situations where more of these
resources are conserved demonstrates a higher level of usability if the proposed principles
are valid.
3.2.4

Development
For the purposes of the study, mobile devices with GPS capability were needed.

The mobile device can be used in many contexts, and in very personal ways (Barkhuus &
Polichar, 2011). The operating systems on the platform are increasingly diverse, as are
the capabilities of each platform (Tilson, Sorensen, & Lyytinen, 2012). To create the
greatest accessibility across mobile devices, web applications that are accessed using a
mobile browser have become more popular than creating the application in each native
operating system (Qing & Clark, 2013). Web applications that run in Internet browsers
are compatible with all current mobile platform and allow a comparison to desktop.
The web application used as the artifact was created using the Bootstrap web
design framework which uses pre-defined Cascading Style Sheet (CSS) classes more
easily create responsive screens which adapt to various device sizes (Lerner, 2012). The
scripting backend was the Angularjs JavaScript framework which uses the Model-ViewWhatever (MVW) structure for separating the presentation layer from the database layer
(Ramos, Valente, Terra, & Santos, 2016). These structures allow web application
development that can use modular programming similar to traditional programming
languages (Ramos et al., 2016).
The backend uses Google’s Firebase platform for authentication (Google, 2017a).
Firebase provides basic authentication with email as the UID. There are also options to
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use federated identity providers like Facebook, Twitter, and GitHub. Using Firebase
authentication ensures a secure and stable authentication protocol with minimal code for
integration. The Firebase platform also provides a no-SQL database for data collection in
the cloud (Google, 2017b). The data is synchronized in real-time, and remains available
even when the application is off-line. A data console allows a developer to interact with
the data directly, as well as through Application Programming Interface (API).

Figure 6. Two Views of CLUE Home Screen with Functionality Labeled
A screenshot of the CLUE interface home screen is shown in Figure 6 with labels
describing the functionality on the screen. Key functionalities of the interface that apply
the proposed security-usability principles are labeled by the large blue arrows. The
functionality may relate to more than one of the design principles. Only the functionalities
in the interface directly related to user interaction with authentication are labelled.
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Table 6. Application of Security Principles to CLUE Design (Subset)
CLUE
element

Principle

Usability Equivalent

Discussion

User in control

User chooses websites

Match system to real world

Menu like restaurant

Complete
Mediation

Error prevention and Help

Help option on menu

Least
Common
Mechanism

Consistency in placement

Upper right corner

Reduce cognitive load
Recognition rather than recall

Select instead of type

Aesthetic and minimalist design

Hide/display on click

Shortcuts for experience

User can change mode

Match system and real world

Icons use traffic light
color (red/yellow/green)

Visibility of system status

Risk level on screen

Least Surprise

Menu of
websites

Economy of
Mechanism

Least
Surprise

GPS
mode

Favorites
Carousel

Complete
Mediation

Informative Consistent Feedback Pictures instead of words

Economy of
mechanism

Aesthetic and minimalist design

Pictures instead of words

Principle of
Least
Privilege

Limit Functionality/Access to
Reduce Complexity

Auto-set risk level

Economy of
mechanism

Reduce cognitive load
Aesthetic and minimalist design

Select from screen
Large icons as default
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In Table 6 the security-usability principles derived in 3.1.3 are mapped to the
corresponding functionality in the CLUE interface. Each user interaction with the CLUE
interface was designed to conserve the number of keystrokes/clicks, the cognitive load on
the user, the complexity of the layout on a smaller screen, the number of processes that run,
and apply the maximum security-usability principles possible.

Simply following a

checklist has not produced high quality usable interfaces (Zezschwitz, Dunphy, & Luca,
2013). At an IBM research facility, examining software designs and getting predictive
feedback on user interactions even at the wireframe stage was critical to a successful
software design (Bellamy, John, & Kogan, 2011). This technique, which produced the user
interface design instrument Cogtool, was used to measure the efficiency of CLUE.

Figure 7. Design Science Research Applied to Proposed Research.
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3.3

Evaluation
The CLUE interface embodies the combined security-usability principles for

mobile devices described above. In Figure 7, the steps followed are summarized and
mapped to DSR. In the evaluation phase, the CLUE interface is assessed using the web
application created as an artifact to instantiate the mobile security design principles. The
artifact was evaluated based on the following hypotheses to prove security usability for
mobile devices requires conservation instead of complication.


H0: CLUE will have no impact on the usability of basic authentication



H1: CLUE will increase the user success navigating basic authentication



H2: CLUE will improve the user experience of using basic authentication
The first two hypotheses looks at whether the user achieved entry into the

application and did not have to retrieve either the UID or password, or need to reset
password. Lack of success has typically led to circumventing security or insecure
practices like writing passwords down (Nelson & Vu, 2010). Avoiding those timeconsuming actions leads to both success and improved experience.


H3: CLUE will improve usability by reducing the power consumed by reducing
the frequency of issuing the security challenge



H4: CLUE will improve usability by minimizing manipulation of the device
during authentication in ways such as keystrokes and screen swipes
Measuring power from a hardware perspective is a complicated procedure and

typically prohibitively expensive for the software designer with the usual skill set
(Hudert, Niemann, & Eymann, 2010). Instead, application developers are encouraged to
conserve power by reducing displays, calls to networks, and screen refreshes (John,

43
Swart, Bellamy, Blackmon, & Brown, 2013). The third hypothesis uses this convention
of avoiding power usage to measure the conservation of power.
The fourth hypothesis explores the concept that the manipulation of the form
factors is the root of the lack of usability for many applications on the mobile platform
(Li, Guy, Yatani, & Truong, 2011; Serrano, Lecolinet, & Guiard, 2013; Shirazi, Henze,
Dingler, Kunze, & Schmidt, 2013), and even more so for security (Chiang & Chiasson,
2013).


H5: CLUE will improve usability by conserving user effort such as memory
recall, and task identification



H6: Non-workstation (mobile) use of basic authentication with design principles
of CLUE will show less difficulty than workstation use of basic authentication.
The fifth hypothesis focuses on the role of cognitive effort in the actions involved

in basic authentication. This effort is less obvious than the physical challenges explored
in the first hypothesis, but the importance of conserving cognitive effort is recognized as
needed in authentication (Herzberg & Margulies, 2012; Theofanos & Pfleeger, 2011).
Finally, the sixth hypothesis looks at the higher level of difficulty experienced by users of
security interfaces on mobile versus desktop (Oberheide & Jahanian, 2010).
As mentioned in the literature review, usability is characterized by efficiency,
effectiveness, and satisfaction (Jokela, Iivari, Matero, & Karukka, 2003). To validate that
applying the security-usability design principles for mobile device to security interfaces
increases usability, three phases of validation were done, each aligned with a
characteristic of usability.
The current preferred norm for basic authentication provides no assistance for
retrieving the UID or the password (Capek, Hub, Myskova, & Roudny, 2010). Within
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the CLUE interface the High-risk location is the option/pathway/mode that equates to that
norm. Consequently, measures taken for High-risk mode represents the pre-experimental
conditions. The basic authentication, in spite of its weaknesses, is still the ISO standard
for entity authentication (Basin, Cremers, & Meier, 2012).
In Table 7 the various phases of the evaluation that correspond to the ISO 924111 characteristics of usability (Jokela et al., 2003) are summarized and mapped to the
hypotheses. In each case the hypotheses are supported or/ refuted by applying the
principles to the design as a whole, not as individual principles. Details of each phase are
Table 7. Summary of Evaluation Phases and Hypotheses Measured
Phase

Research
Method

Principle(s) tested

Hypotheses

Simulation
with known
instrument
Cogtool

Economy of
mechanism,
Complete
mediation

H0 – no impact
H1 – success in navigation
H3 – power conserved
H4 – Form factor conserved
H5 – User effort conserved
H6 - Mobile vs Desktop

2-Effectiveness

Experiment

Least Surprise,
Economy of
Mechanism,
Least Privilege,
Complete
Mediation,
Least common
mechanism

H0 – no impact
H1 – success in navigation
H2 – user satisfaction
H3 – power conserved
H4 – Form factor conserved
H5 – User effort conserved
H6 - Mobile vs Desktop

3-Satisfaction

Survey

Least Surprise,
Economy of
Mechanism,
Complete
Mediation

H0 – no impact
H1 – success rate
H2 – user satisfaction
H5 – User effort conserved
H6 - Mobile vs Desktop

1-Efficiency
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in the sections following the table. Combining cognitive modelling like Phase 1 with a
user study like Phase 2 gives more evidence and better perspectives (Bhensook &
Senivongse, 2012).

3.3.1

Use Cases
In phase 1 and 2 of evaluation, the following use cases are to generate the data for

measurement. Each use case describes a sequence of events related to a user’s interaction
with the CLUE security interface. There are four possible use cases in the CLUE
interface for a user’s interaction with an interface with password-UID authentication
(Table 8). Depending on the security mode as set by GPS location, described in 3.2.3,
the user gets varying amounts of assistance to navigate the user interface. Detailed
diagrams of use cases appear in Appendix A.
Table 8. Use Cases for Testing Security Set by Location
Use
Case

Got
UID?

Got
Password
?

Assistance given
(applying principles0

Comments

1

Yes

Yes

All modes need no assistance All modes lead to success

2

Yes

No

High- none
Medium - UID
Low – UID & password hint

High fails, other modes
may succeed

3

No

Yes

High- none
Medium - UID
Low – UID & password hint

High fails, other modes
may succeed with
assistance

4

No

No

High- none
Medium - UID
Low - UID & password hint

High fails, other modes
have more success

46

3.3.2

Measuring the Constrained Resources
Within the evaluation phase, the consumption of constrained resources was

measured both in the design phase, and during actual user interaction. Previous research
in HCI and security interfaces on the mobile platform provides guidance on which
indicators to measure (Table 9). Cognitive activity as a critical component of usability
frameworks is also supported by constructs employed by usability professionals to
evaluate system use (Hertzum & Clemmensen, 2012).
Table 9. Actions to Measure for Constrained Resources
Constrained Action to Measure
Resource

Reference

Power

Screen display
30 sec elapsed display
CPU call by command button

Knight, Pyrzak, & Green, 2007
Hudert et al., 2010
Anand et al., 2011

Form Factor

# of Keystrokes (desktop)
# of Screen Touch/Swipe
(mobile)

Holleis, Scherr, & Broll, 2011
Bernal, Ardito, Morisio, & Falcarin,
2010
Dunphy & Olivier, 2012

# of Button pushes
User effort

# of pure Mental recalls
# of cued mental recalls

Holleis et al., 2011
Holleis et al., 2011

These three manifestations of display, CPU, and network consume 45-50% of the
total system power on the typical smart phone (Knight et al., 2007). Therefore, to
measure power consumption from the context of the CLUE interface, three
manifestations of expending power are recorded as seen in Figure 8.
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Figure 8. Measuring Constrained Resources
To measure how much manipulation of the form factors is required, the number of
keystrokes plus the number of screen swipes/touches and the number of physical buttons
pushes (other than keyboard) is recorded. Though Li, Liu, Liu, Wang, Li, and Rau
(2010) proposed nine new operators to describe a user’s physical interaction with mobile
devices, not all these operators are valid in the context of a security interface. Since this
research looks at reducing the number of keystrokes and screen interactions, the different
motivations for the physical interactions that motivate the delineation described by Li et
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al. (2010) are not of interest. This summarization of the physical operators is supported
by Holleis et al. (2011) in their expansion of KLM to study NFC tags on the mobile
platform.
Both Holleis et al. (2011) and Li et al. (2011) combined a mental effort operator
with physical operator (s) to describe an operation block. In the expert user community
that Holleis et al. (2011) and Li et al. (2011) study this sequencing may be valid.
However for the novice or less technology literate, the mental effort may vary within that
sequence of mental and physical actions. This research focuses on the novice user, so the
mental effort is separated from physical effort. Studies of literate and non-literate mobile
phone users in India support this separation of physical form factor effort from mental
effort (Holleis, Luther, Broll, & Souville, 2013). The results of rural mobile phone usage
indicate little variance in the physical effort, but a great variance in the usability of the
mental effort tasks between the literate and non-literate users. Cognitive activity as a
critical component of usability frameworks is also supported by constructs employed by
usability professionals to evaluate system use (Hertzum & Clemmensen, 2012).
User effort to recall is measured by recording the number of times a user is asked
to recall information with and without a cue, and how many steps are in a process
sequence executed by a user. Each process step equates to a recall “unit” of measure.
Each recall with a cue is equated to one effort unit. Each recall without a cue is measured
as two units, because of the higher level of difficulty and cognitive load. This
consideration of the user cognitive activity, and weighting of increased difficulty as a
component of usability, is supported by the usability professionals common research
constructs analyzed by Hertzum et al (2012).
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Previous studies have looked at keystrokes as a measure of the usability of a
system, such as the total-effort metrics approach (Kim et al., 2010). As usability
designers continue to examine the difference between desktop keystrokes and mobile
device keystrokes, amendment of the Keystroke-Level-Modeling protocols (Card et al.
1980), particularly in the area of security interfaces, have been necessary to
accommodate the reality of mobile (Dunphy & Olivier, 2012; Zezschwitz et al., 2013).
This research looks for the impact in more than one area of resource consumption.
3.3.3

Phase 1 – Efficiency with CogTool
A CogTool score of application complexity is used to measure the efficiency of

the CLUE security interface, As discussed in 3.2.4CogTool was developed by usability
researchers to model the complexity of an application interface based on wireframes of
the planned screens, and a mapping of the flow between these screens (John, 2011). The
CogTool score is based on a database of human performers using computer interfaces. A
lower CogTool score indicates a less complex interface which is more desirable.
CogTool can create a usability measure at the design stage, instead at the
production stage. This allows fine-tuning of a design without the expense of
programming (Zezschwitz et al., 2013). In this study the measures were done at the end
of development to provide a measure of usability of the final version.
Other functionalities available for adding categories, websites, and new locations
to the various security modes are not part of an authentication sequence and thereby
excluded from the measures in this study.
Hypotheses Tested
In Phase 1 evaluation of the efficiency of security-usability, the following
hypotheses are addressed as described in Table 10.
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Table 10. Phase 1 Hypotheses Validation
Hypothesis

Measurement

Measuring success

H0 - no impact

Overall CogTool score for
all security tasks

High is the current norm High
risk score would be less than or
equal to score for the Medium
and Low risk meaning the
principles don’t apply

H1 - impact on
usability

Overall CogTool score for
all security tasks

High is the current norm. High
risk score would be greater than
score for the Medium and Low
risk meaning principles apply

H2 - improve the user
experience

CogTool score of each
security task for each
platform and each security
mode

Score for Low and Medium risk
are lower than High risk for
using for each task

H3 - conserving power CogTool score for power
subtasks that make up the
security tasks

Score for Low and Medium risk
are lower than High risk

H4 - reducing
manipulation

CogTool score for form
factor subtasks that make
up the security tasks

Score for Low and Medium risk
are lower than High risk

H5 - conserving user
effort

CogTool score for user
effort subtasks that make
up the security tasks

Score for Low and Medium risk
are lower than High risk

H6- Mobile vs desktop Overall CogTool score for
each security task on each
platform

Score for security task on
mobile is lower than score on
desktop once principles applied
for Med and Low modes

Data Collection for Phase 1 Efficiency
To compute a CogTool score the designer creates a wireframe of the interactions
that to be measured. The transitions that occur between the various screens are drawn out
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and described based on how they are accomplished. For example, typing in a textbox
transition using a workstation or desktop involves a keyboard and a string of characters
that are entered. In the illustration below the wireframes of the CLUE artifact are linked
with arrows that have data attached that describe the actions that take place when
transitioning between the screens. In Figure 9 the wireframe for the interface on desktop
for low risk can be seen. Wireframes for the other designs are in Appendix B.

Figure 9. CogTool Wireframe of Desktop Design for Low Risk

Once the wireframes are linked with transitions, the designer goes into the
CogTool demonstrate mode to walk through the tasks. Four security-related tasks were
analyzed for usability in each design (Table 11). Three versions of the security interface
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to a web application were created with varying amounts of user cognitive effort and
screen interactions. Because the artifact was a web application, the same interfaces were
evaluated on the traditional workstation and on mobile devices. The study examines the
difference between a security-interfaces constrained on the mobile platform. Therefore
when the designer demonstrates the task, it is done on a design that reflects the form
factor, user effort, and power that is available on a workstation, as well as a design that
shows the capabilities of a mobile device.
Table 11. Security-related Tasks for Basic Authentication
Task
Logon Attempt

Knows UID
Yes

Knows Password
Yes

UID recovery

No

Yes

Password Reset

Yes

No

Password Recovery (Cued recall)

No

No

These same four security tasks are used to describe the path taken by a user
through the security interface. There are four possible paths through the interface based
what security information the user possesses. Depending on the design of the interface,
the designer demonstrated more or less of the tasks. For example, as part of the design
for medium and low risk the UID is provided as part of the assistance offered to the user.
Therefore in medium or low mode the UID recovery task is never performed. The
password recovery task is only available in low mode. On the other hand Logon Attempt
and password reset tasks are used in all risk modes. Use Case 4, where the user does not
know UID or password is diagrammed in Figure 10. The diagrams for all four use cases
appear in Appendix A.

53
In the diagram (Figure 10) the red arrows represent the current norm, which is
High risk. The yellow arrows represent Medium risk, and the green arrows the Low risk
mode. Using the diagrams for the four use cases, the security tasks that must be
performed to achieve successful authentication in each instance are clear. The CogTool
score for successful authentication becomes the sum of the security-related tasks that are
on the path for a particular design (Zezschwitz et al., 2013).

Figure 10. Use Case 4 - User Does Not Know UID or Password
The UID password used to “demonstrate” or walk through a Cogtool simulation
was chosen to emulate the most typical values used for user accounts. Before emails
became common-place, users chose random usernames as an account identifier
(Poremba, 2014). Email addresses became a popular option with account suppliers
because they are already unique and provide a communication channel for both
marketing and password recovery.
The majority of email address ranges between 16-28 characters (Bliss, 2015). On
the other hand, email addresses generated from legacy systems such as Unix are typically
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8 characters plus “@”plus a domain name for the email server (Blezard & Marceau,
2002). Users typically prefer a shorter email particularly if typing on a mobile phone.
Therefore the UID chosen for the simulation is: abcdefgh@abcd.com.
The password for the demonstration was chosen to follow rules for a strong
password which are shown in Table 12. A special character is also a frequent requirement
for passwords generated by banks and other institutions providing access to sensitive
information. Therefore the password chosen for the simulation was: Abcdefgh2`
After the simulation of the path through the security interface is complete, CogTool
computes a score which indicates the difficulty in seconds.
Table 12. Rules for a Strong Password (Horcher & Tejay, 2009)
Rule
8 characters or more

Derivation from Literature
Morris and Thompson, 1979 (Morris & Thompson,
1979)

At least one number and at least Vu et al., 2007 (Vu et al., 2007)
one uppercase
Misspell words

Keith, Shao and Steinbart, 2007 (Keith, Shao, &
Steinbart, 2007)

Use Passphrase

Pinkas and Sander, 2002 (Pinkas & Sander, 2002)

No seasons, days of the week, Morris and Thompson, 1979 (Morris & Thompson,
months, or names
1979)
Mapping the sub-tasks
The current version of Cogtool provides a visualization of how the measures of
user interaction is generated. In the tool only two visualizations can be compared at a
time (Figure 11). The measures on the visualization graph are broken down into eye
movements, left-hand movements, and cognition. Looking at the visualization example
of email input on desktop and mobile, it is clear that the same keystroke on desktop uses
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different resources on each platform and different amounts of that resource. In particular,
more of the constrained resources of user effort (aka cognition) and form factor (Eyemove, Right-hand, Left-hand) are consumed on mobile.

Figure 11. Cogtool Visualization of Input on Desktop (above) and Mobile (below)
Unfortunately this level of granularity is not in the reports available to the
designer using the tool. To make the data for the CogTool score more granular for
analysis, each security task was divided into subtasks for demonstration. Each subtask
corresponds roughly to one of the three constrained resources. The subtasks typically
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represent a self-contained sequence that can possibly be avoided by re-design and
subsequently conserve a resource. Breaking the predicted resource consumption down by
the constrained resources allows individual confirmation/refutation of hypotheses related
to these resources.

Figure 12. Sample Values from CogTool
Data Analysis
CogTool was used to create a score for each mode of security access, according to
the use cases described in 3.3.1. The CogTool scores were also created for the
constrained resources for each design. A comparative analysis of the resulting scores is
how the data is typically analyzed to determine the best alternative. During the
introduction of CogTool at the IBM research laboratories software designs were scored
with CogTool, and the resulting scores and graphs of functionality implementation
compared. John et al. (2011) also found the process of visualization required for the
CogTool analysis provided clarity to the designers. The CogTool scores were also used
to identify which tasks are consuming the greatest amount of constrained resources.
3.3.4

Phase 2 –Effectiveness
In this phase the impact of the CLUE interface design on user navigation of basic

(password-UID) authentication on website was assessed. The actual usage data collected
reveals how often the assistance offered by CLUE is invoked as part of daily usage.
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Experimental research method was chosen because evaluating a design artifact
using an experiment empirically demonstrates the qualities of the artifact and provides an
avenue for generalizing the findings to a larger context (D'Aubeterre, Singh, & Iyer,
2008). An experiment frequently compares a previous norm with a changed set of
conditions. As described in 3.2.3, the previous norm is the “High-risk” mode which
provides no additional assistance. The degree to which data collected for “Mediumrisk,” and “Low-risk” deviate from the data collected for “High-risk” clearly illustrates
the impact of the applying the security-usability principles.
The CLUE interface automatically collects data about which sites were used, the
security mode used, how long the user spent in the interface, and whether the usage was
successful. The data collected about usage is appears the data model shown in Figure 13.

.
Figure 13. Data Model of Phase 2 Data
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Experimental Design
To evaluate the web application created as an artifact to illustrate the securityusability design principles for mobile devices; this phase study used a quasi-experiment
with repeated measures and counter-balanced design. The decision process for design
type is shown in Figure 14.

Figure 14. Experiment Design Decision Process (Lazar, Feng, & Hochheiser, 2010)
This phase used a repeated measures design, in which subjects act as their own
control as they are exposed to all versions or variations of the changed conditions
(D’Aubeterre et al., 2008). In this study, the control was represented by the “High”
mode. The repeated measures design provides powerful statistics even with a limited
subject group.
After initial training and the first set of measures, the subjects used the various
modes based on their location. The number of tasks possible within the interface is
minimized as described in Appendix A. A smaller number of tasks improves the ability
of the users to identify usability problems (Bruun & Stage, 2012). The frequency of how
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often the subjects invoke each mode determined the success rate of the improved modes
of “Medium,” and “Low” versus the current norm represented by “High.”
Subjects
The subjects for this study were recruited from an organization of small business
owners and professionals, a group of technical women, and university students. These
subjects were a convenience sample, recruited from organizations to which the principal
investigator had access. The technical women, ranging from 22-75, belonged to a
national group and represent both academic and business leaders with a high level of
computer literacy. The business owners and professionals, on the other hand, ranged in
age from 22-75, split almost 50-50 in gender, and range in technology ability from
neophyte to skilled computer support. The university students included both graduates
and undergraduates ranging in age from 18-28. The subject population consisted of 1520 subjects as is typical for usability studies (Hwang & Salvendy, 2010), particularly of
non-medical systems (Schmettow, Vos, & Schraagen, 2013)
Participation in the study was voluntary. An incentive of a gift card was provided
to every subject who completed the tasks in this phase, Phase 2, as listed in Appendix C,
plus Phase 3 of the CLUE evaluation. Incentives such as cash and gift cards are typical
techniques for recruiting research study participants (T. Park et al., 2011) and have been
shown to improve the quality of the participants’ interaction (H. Li et al., 2010).
Procedure
There are three stages to the experimental procedure: configuration, initial usage,
ongoing usage (Appendix D). The configuration stage was designed to absorb all the
user effort present only at setup, and remove it from the experiment evaluation. This
reflects a batteries-included approach (Dubois, 2007) to technology interaction. A
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questionnaire administered by Surveygizmo provided default values for the websites
configured in the CLUE interface. The data from Surveygizmo similar to other Internet
survey tools like Survey Monkey.
The survey data was analyzed using frequency tables to see which websites and
categories are the appropriate values to be presented as the default set. The questions
asked during the survey were used to determine the most commonly used Internet sites
that require password authentication, typical categories that users used to describe the
sites in terms of security risk, and what security risk level the users felt relevant to
particular sites. Research conducted on the security needs of the at-home user versus the
business user indicates that there is a growing perception that security needs vary by
application (Hayashi, Riva, Strauss, Brush, & Schechter, 2012).
Because Internet website landscape is a rapidly evolving environment, the most
common sites were updated over the course of the study (Androutsos, 2011). The
questionnaire provided a consistent data feed for that information not biased by the
perspective of an individual blogger, and more current for an Internet user population
possessing varying levels of technology competency of the CLUE interface.
The questionnaire used for Surveygizmo appears in Appendix E.
The initial usage stage introduced the subject to the interface using a tutorial. .
The subject then signed up for an account so their usage of CLUE could be authenticated.
The ongoing usage stage tracked usage of the CLUE interface in a natural setting, with a
daily reminder via text message and email with a suggested task. This type of data is
more revealing of day-to-day usage patterns and is a preferred measure of usability,
particularly on mobile platform (Zezschwitz et al., 2013). Studies involving mobile
device interactions with web browsers (Shirazi et al., 2013) similar to the CLUE interface
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have illustrated the value of field data, particularly when validating and deriving design
guidelines.

Figure 15. Data Model of User Setup Done in Configuration.
The subjects interact with the CLUE interface for two weeks. A minimum
amount of usage was required to receive the incentive. A data model of the configuration
and data collection appears in Figure 15. At the end of two weeks, the subject was
invited to take the satisfaction survey described in Phase 3 of evaluation. The following
hypotheses are tested during this phase of the evaluation, as seen in Table 13.
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Table 13. Phase 2 Hypotheses Tested
Hypothesis

Variables

Indicators

H0 - no impact

Security mode

There is no difference in the rate of
successful usage
Resource consumption will be the same
across all modes
Medium and low security modes will
lower to no frequency of usage

Success/Fail

H1- will increase
the success

Success/Fail
per usage and
Security mode

Security modes with medium and low
security will have a higher success rate

H3 – conserving
power

#screen displays
#processes
# elapsed

Medium and low security modes will
have lower power consumption recorded

H4 – reducing
manipulation

#keystrokes
Medium and low security modes will
#swipes/taps
have less form factors recorded
#Physical button push

H5 – reduce user
effort

# pure recall
# cued recall
# multi-step
sequences

Medium and low security modes will
have less user effort requested

Data Analysis
The datasets with the usage data described in Figure 13, plus the demographic and
configuration data described in Figure 15, were loaded into SPSS and Excel. The impact
of applying the security principles was examined by looking at the rate of successful
usage of the medium and low security modes. The frequency of how often the low and
medium security modes are invoked shows how often the resources are conserved. The
duration of usage was analyzed to determine the typical amount of time spent navigating
authentication in both desktop and mobile environments in the original and new designs.
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3.3.5

Phase 3 – User Satisfaction
The third study assesses user satisfaction using the survey method. Surveys are a

widely accepted method for gathering this measure within both the security and usability
communities (Bowen, Reeves, & Schweer, 2013). One of the most popular, and wellvalidated, is the Standardized Usability Scale (SUS), a standardized questionnaire created
by Brooke (1996) at Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC) as a quick and dirty
assessment of usability. Over 500 additional research studies applying SUS have proven
that the scale is quick, but not so dirty assessment (Sauro, 2011). This questionnaire is
considered the best of open-source norm available (Heeringa, West, & Berglund, 2010).

Figure 16. Standard SUS Reported Likert Scale
The SUS uses the following response format shown in Figure 16. It uses a 5 point
scale to assess user attitudes (Likert, 1932). The results of raw SUS scores when
converted to percentiles yield a letter grade for the application which can be compared to
other studies.
The goal of the survey was to evaluate the security interface within the CLUE
artifact. Exposing subjects to another security interface to authenticate to collect survey
data could influence the user perception of the target interface. To avoid this the
presentation of the survey was designed according to the same usability principles as
used for the CLUE interface, and matched to the look and feel of CLUE. The use of
color with green to indicate positive and red to indicate negative, with white as neutral
conserves user effort by indicating meaning without requiring the user to read the screen
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(Figure 17). This follows the Finstad study that uses images to solicit responses to
eliminate the need to read the scale (Finstad, 2010). The on-screen targets for responses
are the recommended size of 9.2 mm to allow easy acquisition from a touchscreen (Parhi,
Karlson, & Bederson, 2006).

Figure 17. Mobile-optimized Response Format with Color Coding
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Survey Design
The SUS contains 10 items with those five response options, as seen in Table
14. The questions were all expressed as positives, instead of flipping between positive
and negative. Recent research from Sauro and Lewis (2011) shows that reversing the
direction of the usability evaluation can result in inconsistent answers if the subject
responding does not notice the re-calibration in scale. The reverse also requires the
researcher recode the responses to keep the scale consistent. The responses with a
consistent scale direction (all positive) were demonstrated to have similar accuracy to the
traditional reversing scale.
Table 14. Standardized Usability Survey – Positive response (Sauro & Lewis, 2011)
Item #

Question

1

I think that I would like to use this system frequently

2

I found the system to be simple.

3

I thought the system was easy to use.

4

I think that I could use this app without the support of a technical person.

5

I found the various functions in this system were well integrated.

6

I thought there was a lot of consistency in this system

7

I would imagine that most people would learn to use this system very
quickly.

8

I found the system very intuitive.

9

I felt very confident using the system.

10

I could use the system without having to learn anything new.
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As recommended Sauro and Lewis (2011), the specific description of “CLUE”
was inserted in place of the more generic term, “system.” The addition of actual system
name instead of a generic does not affect validity of responses. Data analysis was done
using the techniques described below on the standard subgroups within the questionnaire.
Subjects and Procedure
The subjects for the survey are the same participants used for Phase 2 study used
to evaluate effectiveness. After two weeks of using the CLUE artifact, the subjects are
prompted via email, and in the app, to fill out the exit survey. In each case the link to
survey is specific to each user to allow correlation of survey data with demographic and
usage information collected in Phase 2. The subjects receive an incentive for completing
the survey. Subjects who do not complete the survey, do not receive the incentive.
Hypotheses Tested
The survey data will be evaluated to support or refute the hypotheses. Specific
questions are mapped to specific hypotheses as shown in Table 15.
Table 15. Phase 3 Hypotheses Tested
Hypothesis

Measurement

Measuring success

H1- Applying principles
will increase the success
of the user in completing
authentication

Examine questions about
success
(#1,#2,#3,#5,#6,#7,#8,#9 on
SUS)

Favorable rating received
as answers on usability
questions

H4 – reducing
manipulation

Examine questions about
manipulating the system (#2,
#6, #8)

Positive rating received as
answers on these questions

H5 – conserving user
effort

Examine questions that
address user cognitive effort
(#4, #5, #7, #10)

Positive rating received as
answers on these questions
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Data Analysis
The data analysis for the SUS response will use the accepted techniques for
generating a grade from the raw score as described by Sauro (2011), and shown in Table
16. In addition analyzing the subscales for learnability and usability (Lewis and Sauro
2009) will provide measures to support or refute the hypotheses related to conserving
user effort and manipulation of form factors as described in Evaluation above. The
techniques provided in Table 16 provide a letter grade that indicates a favorable or
unfavorable rating. That is the advantage to SUS – the letter grade is a standard output of
the data analysis.
Table 16. Statistics Analysis for SUS Data (Sauro, 2011)
Stat

Description

Percent Agree

summarize the percent of respondents who agreed to the item

Top-Box

For 5-point scales the top box is strongly agree

Net Top Box

The number of respondents that select the top choice (strongly
agree) minus the number that select the bottom choice (strongly
Disagree choice

Z-Score to
Percentile Rank

This is a Six-Sigma technique. It converts the raw score into a
normal score—because rating scale means often follow a
normal or close to normal distribution.

Coefficient of
Variation

Used instead of standard deviation because there is a mix of
scale points in data. The CV divides the standard deviation by
the mean. (1 Higher values indicate higher variability)

3.4

Summary
This chapter provided an introduction to security usability and design science

research methodology. The mapping of security design principles to usability principles
yielded a combined set of principles. According to this mapping, usability is a subset of
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good security. The limited resources on the mobile platform are described. The
combined security-usability principles will be focused according to the limitations of the
mobile platform. This will produce a set of security-usability principles focused on the
mobile platform.
Once the theoretical background was explained, the research design was
presented. The research design reviewed the research methodology, with a high level
breakdown of the data collection and analysis. The data collection and analysis section
provided the necessary research steps required. The instantiation of the principles was
done in three phases, with data collected that related to efficiency, effectiveness, and user
satisfaction. Each phase evaluated one or more of the hypotheses, with some of the
hypotheses evaluated in all three phases. The measures used for determining the support
or non-support of the hypotheses were identified for each phase. Materials and resources
were then identified for completing the study.
.
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4.

Chapter 4

Chapter 4
Results
This chapter reports the results from the data collection described in Chapter 3.
Each phase is reported separately. The data collected for the phase is summarized in a
table and displayed in a graph, where appropriate. After the results for each phase the
hypotheses that were tested in that phase are refuted or confirmed.
4.1

Phase 1 – CogTool Analysis of Efficiency
As described in the methodology, the current state of basic authentication is

represented by the risk mode labelled “High.” Six different designs were mapped in
CogTool, representing High, Medium, and Low risk modes on both a desktop and mobile
platforms. Four primary security-related tasks were modelled including logon attempts,
recovering user identifiers and password, and getting a clue to recall a password.
CogTool provides the ability to export the demonstration as a series of steps to a
comma-limited values (CSV) file, but the difficulty score is not attached. To get the
difficulty scores separated by the constrained resource being deployed, the Cogtool
actions as described in the CSV file were mapped to power, user effort, and form factors.
Then the individual actions were demonstrated, and a difficulty score computed for each
separate action by CogTool (Table 17). Power and user effort both only related to one
Cogtool action. Assigning a difficulty for cognitive effort tasks requires consideration of
the mental task being performed (Shankar, Lin, Brown, & Rice, 2015). Within the
Cogtool predictions there needs to be an adjustment for mental effort for more complex
tasks. The most complex task, computing a new password, has the most analysis and
consequently the greatest difficulty.
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Table 17. Difficulty Scores in Seconds for Constrained Resources by Action
Action to
Measure

Constrained
Resource

CogTool Equivalent

Difficulty
Desktop

Difficulty
Mobile

Display a screen

Power

Look at

0.5 sec

0.5 sec

Recognition

user effort

Think

1.2 sec

1.2 sec

Decide

user effort

Think + Think +Think
Decision require
evaluation of option 1,
evaluation of option 2,
and choice.

3.6 sec

3.6 sec

Compute input

user effort

Think + Think + Think
+ Think
A multiple step mental
process with a recall of
requirements like
password, and
composing an entry that
meets the rules.

4.8 sec

4.8 sec

Input character

form factor

Input lower case
character

0.4 sec

1.8 sec

Input UC

form factor

Input upper case
character

0.6 sec

3.4 sec

Input Special

form factor

Input special character

0.7 sec

5.1 sec

Input UClc

form factor

Input upper case
followed by lower case

1.0 sec

5.1 sec

Move and Tap

form factor

Move finger to target
and Tap touchscreen

NA

0.6 sec

Move Mouse

form factor

Move Mouse to target
and Left Click

2.0 sec

NA

Move-no-think

form factor

Move Mouse from
muscle memory

0.9 sec

NA
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Actions represent a discrete activity accomplished by the user, similar to the atom
in chemistry. Within the actions are smaller components, which appear within the
CogTool scripts and are automatically added as an action is demonstrated. Because no
password recovery was available in the High and Medium risk modes, the values are
identical to password reset are used because that is the action taken by the user.
Password reset is identical between the three design modes, because it is outside the
webapp and is based on interaction with the Google Firebase authentication architecture.

Figure 18. Compare All Security Tasks for All Risk Modes
The Cogtool score was also generated for the overall design of each version of the
security interface design by combining the scores from all the security tasks (Appendix F
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- CogTool Mapping Data). The scores for power consumption from a screen display
were auto-generated based on the assumptions made by Cogtool. Wherever Cogtool
determined a new screen had appeared, a “Look At” action was added to the script which
is mapped to a use of power.
Other actions are also auto-generated by Cogtool based on the database of human
performance modelling data. For example, every keyboard press automatically creates a
hand movement action with the correct hand that would be used by typist using the
QWERTY keyboard. For a touchscreen interaction, a cognitive action to identify hand
position is auto-generated based on the need for the user to look at the keyboard and
identify the spot to touch (John, 2011).
An overall score for all security task demonstrations appears in Figure 19. As
suggested by the greater form factor difficulty for individual actions (Table 17), mobile
has a higher difficulty in seconds for the current norm, which is labelled “High.”

The

design changes to conserve constrained resources on mobile in the “Medium” and “Low”
versions show improvement on scores were generated for “High.”

Seconds

250
200
150
100
50
0

desktop
mobile

1-High
103.2
196.2

2-Med
86.9
153.7

3-Low
57.3
99.7

Total difficulty used for all security tasks
Figure 19. Total Difficulty for Each Design for All Resources
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The Logon Attempt and Password Reset security tasks were projected to be the
most difficult task according to the Cogtool measure. Logon Attempt is simply the
successful input of a UID and password. The Logon Attempt typically occurs on every
usage of an application. Making this task more usable would have frequent and high
impact on user satisfaction for both desktop and mobile. But for mobile, the Cogtool
score for the Logon Attempt task is three times higher for mobile versus the desktop
platform (Figure 20). Moving the Logon Attempt task as designed for desktop to mobile,
which is represented by “Highmobile”, does not conserve the constrained resources and
results in lower usability.

Figure 20. Difficulty in Seconds of Logon Attempt Comparison
4.1.1

Understanding the Security Task Components of Constrained Resources
The Logon Attempt is broken into subtasks (Table 18). The detail shows the

subtasks of inputting both UID and password are responsible for most of the difficulty.
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Table 18. Detailed Difficulty Scores for Subtasks of Logon
Task

High
Desktop

Med
Desktop

Low
Desktop

High
Mobile

Med
Mobile

Low
Mobile

Logon

25.1

14.9

14.9

68.3

32.9

32.9

Subtasks
Display GPS

2.6

0.6

0.6

1.7

0

0

Recall UID

2.5

0

0

3.2

0

0

Input UID

6.9

0

0

31.2

0

0

Recall pw

2.5

2.5

2.5

3.2

3.1

3.1

Input pw

9.8

9.7

9.7

27.8

27.8

27.8

Display Home

0.8

2

2

1.3

1.8

1.9

To check if the constrained resources consumed by each design are conserved, the
CogTool scores for each action were mapped to the constrained resources. Each
CogTool script for each sub-task of each security task was exported individually as a
Comma Separated Variable (CSV) file. (Figure 21). All of the scripts were combined to

Figure 21. Cogtool Script
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one file, and then processed with a Visual Basic (VB) program to assign constrained
resources to actions. The graphs and data table below show how each constrained
resource is conserved for the two revised designs, Medium and Low (Figure 22).

160

140

120

seconds

100

80
60
40
20

3-Low

2-Med

power

1-High

2-Med

3-Low

form factor

1-High

3-Low

2-Med

1-High

0

user effort
form factor
power
user effort
1-High 2-Med 3-Low 1-High 2-Med 3-Low 1-High 2-Med 3-Low
Desktop 30.5 17.2 14.1
6
4.5
3
54
48
32.4
Mobile 27.6 14.6 11.9
8
6.5
4.5
144 111.6 73.2

Comparison of Constrained Resources
Figure 22. Comparison of Constrained Resources
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As stated previously, the Cogtool score is based on a database of multiple users
performing a task generated by the ACT-R Engine (Teo, John, & Blackmon, 2012).
The dependent variable for the analysis is the Cogtool score in seconds for each
individual security task. The Cogtool score is a baseline, not a mean. The following
equation describes the hypotheses:
H0 – Baseline Cogtool High <= Baseline Cogtool Medium or Baseline Cogtool Low
H1 – Baseline Cogtool High

>

Baseline Cogtool Medium and Baseline Cogtool Low

When comparing Cogtool scores of a user interface design the previous studies
use a reduction in interface completion time as the standard for indicating the measure of
an improved design (John, 2011). To compare the designs the percent improvement from
the control value of “High” as well as projected improvement time was calculated (Table
19). Statistical significance is not as pressing as practical significance for software
design (Khansa & Liginlal, 2009). A statistically significant difference does not drive the
typical user to modify behavior, particularly security behavior (Gebauer et al., 2011).
Table 19. Percent Improvement of Overall Cogtool Design
Perceived
Improvement
in seconds
(conserved
resources)

Current
Design (High)
in seconds

Revised
Design in
Seconds

Percent
Improvement

Desktop

103.2

86.9

15.79%

16.3 medium

Desktop

103.2

57.3

44.48%

45.9 low

Mobile

196.2

153.7

21.66%

42.5 medium

Mobile

196.2

99.7

49.18%

96.5 low

Environment

Risk
level
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The user is motivated to change by a perceived less interruption time by the security
interface to the primary task. The measures shown relate the following hypotheses:


H0: CLUE will have no impact on the usability of basic authentication



H1: CLUE will increase the user success navigating basic authentication



H2: CLUE will improve the user experience of using basic authentication

Because the measures on both desktop and mobile show improvement from the
current norm (High) for both revised designs the null hypothesis is refuted. Consequently
H2 User Experience is proven because in Cogtool scores a design which takes less time
to use is an improvement.
The three other hypotheses evaluated in Phase 1 of the study that explore the
individual constrained resources are as follows:


H3: CLUE will improve usability by reducing the power consumed by reducing
the frequency of issuing the security challenge



H4: CLUE will improve usability by minimizing manipulation of the device
during authentication in ways such as keystrokes and screen swipes



H5: CLUE will improve usability by conserving user effort such as memory
recall, and task identification

As shown in Table 20, the Cogtool scores of the individual sub-tasks that
consume the constrained resources of form factor, power, and user effort are compared to
the current norm on both desktop and mobile. All three constrained resources are
conserved in both the Medium and Low designs
conserves a higher amount of the those resources.

The Low risk design, as expected,
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Table 20. Improvement for Constrained Resources in Design

Environment Resource

Control
(High) in
seconds

Design
Change in
seconds

%
Improved
Medium

Perceived
in seconds

Medium
Desktop

form factor

30.5

17.2

43.61%

13.30

Mobile

form factor

27.6

14.6

47.10%

13.00

Desktop

power

6

4.5

25.00%

1.50

Mobile

power

8

6.5

18.75%

1.50

Desktop

user effort

54

48

11.11%

6.00

Mobile

user effort

144

111.6

22.50%

32.40

Desktop

form factor

30.5

14.1

53.77%

16.40

Mobile

form factor

27.6

11.9

56.88%

15.70

Desktop

power

6

3

50.00%

3.00

Mobile

power

8

4.5

43.75%

3.50

Desktop

user effort

54

32.4

40.00%

21.60

Mobile

user effort

144

73.2

49.17%

70.80

Low

4.1.2

Phase 1 – Summary and Commentary of Results
Applying the design changes to traditional desktop did not result in the same

magnitude of improvement as seen in mobile. This is understandable, because the design
principles target mobile constraints. The security task for password reset did not have
any design changes for any risk level on either mobile or desktop, so it would not show
an improvement. The password reset is outside of the webapp created for DSR artifact.
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Password recovery, only available in low risk mode, was available within the webapp and
showed improvement.
Table 21. Phase 1 Summary of Results
Hypothesis

Measurement

Measuring success

Supported

H0 –no
impact

Overall CogTool score
for all security tasks

High risk Cogtool score is
lower than CogTool score for
the Medium and Low Risk
(Table 19)

No

H1 – impact
on usability

Overall CogTool score
for all security tasks

High risk Cogtool score is
higher than CogTool score for
the Medium and Low Risk
(Table 19)

Yes

H2 improve the
user
experience

CogTool score of each
security task for each
platform and each
security mode

CogTool score for Low and
Medium risk are lower than
High risk for using for overall
design (Table 19)

Yes

H3 –
conserving
power

CogTool score for
power subtasks that
make up the security
tasks
CogTool score for form
factor subtasks that
make up the security
tasks
CogTool score for user
effort subtasks that
make up the security
tasks
Overall CogTool score
for each security task

CogTool score for power
subtasks are lower in revised
design (Table 20)

Yes

CogTool score for form factor
subtasks are lower in revised
design (Table 20)

Yes

CogTool score for user effort
subtasks are lower in revised
design (Table 20)

Yes

CogTool score for security
tasks on mobile vs. Cogtool
score on desktop (Figure 18)

No

H4 –
reducing
manipulation
H5 –
conserving
user effort
H6- Mobile
vs. desktop

Even though the design changes result in a lower Cogtool score for Mobile in the
medium and low risk modes, the scores are still not as low as in the Desktop platform.
This indicates more constrained resources need to be conserved than this instantiation on
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the CLUE artifact to achieve parity with security usability on Desktop. Therefore H6 is
refuted.
4.2

Phase 2 Usage Data
As described in 3.3.4, an artifact was created according to DSR methodology to

evaluate the design principles proposed. The structure of the web application (webapp)
that collects the data is described in Appendix G – Data Definitions of Firebase Usage
Data. In the first use of the webapp the subjects set the risk level of various locations based
on GPS. When the user logs into the webapp, the location determines the security level of
the webapp. Subjects received more assistance navigating security in locations that had
lower risk. The data was collected over a period of six months, and includes approximately
1700 uses of the webapp to navigate security interfaces. The next sections first discuss the
demographic data about the subjects who participated in the study. Next the data from the
use of the webapp is analyzed to provide support for the hypotheses proposed in 3.3.2.
4.2.1

Demographic Data
A convenience sample of forty-four individuals were successfully recruited to

participate in the study. The participants were university students, small business
owners, and technical women belonging to Anita Borg Institute group called Systers.
The participants were grouped into five equal age ranges between greater than 18 and
less than or equal to 67. Figure 23 presents the five age groups along with number of
participants in each group, and separated by gender.
Within the youngest group male participants are the majority. But in the older
groups females predominate. Females are also roughly 60% of the sample. Since one
of the recruitment groups was made up of technical women of all ages, the
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predominance of women is expected. Though 118 potential participants were filled out
the pre-study questionnaire to indicate interest in study, only 44 committed to
participate. Even in the initial pre-study phase the interested female participants
outnumbered potential male participants two to one (Appendix H Figure H 1. Gender
Distribution of Potential Subjects).

Age and Gender Distribution of Subjects
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0

Female
Male

18-27
28-37
38-47
48-57
58-67
years old years old years old years old years old
12
4
3
4
3
15

Prefer not to answer

1

1
1

Figure 23. Participants by Gender and Age
The pre-study questionnaire also had potential subject report their educational
level (Figure 24) and technology expertise (Figure 26). All participants reported having
completed High School/GED, and almost half of the participants reported having at least
a Master’s degree. The highest educational level reported were eight Ph.D. degrees.
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Educational Background of Subjects
25

20

15

10

5

0

College

College
diploma

High
school
diploma

3

1

Masters PhD / JD /
Degree
MD

Some
college

Some
doctoral
work

Some
graduate
work

20

Masters

8

4

Doctoral

6

2

Figure 24. Educational Distribution of Subjects
The subjects’ assessment of their own technology expertise showed confidence in
their skills. No one felt their ability was any less than fair. The mean value for
technology expertise was 3.66, with a standard deviation of .888. The subjects with the
highest levels of education assessed themselves as also having the highest levels of
technology expertise.

tech expertise
Mean
3.66

N

Std. Deviation
44

.888

Figure 25. Mean and Standard Deviation of Technology Expertise
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Technology Expertise vs Education for Subjects
14

12
10
8
6
4
2
0

College

fair

good

very good

excellent

2

3

4

5

3

9

12

1

1

6

5

4

2

Doctoral
Masters

1

Figure 26. Technology Expertise vs. Education
Subjects were expected to have experience with smartphones. In the pre-study
survey the subject reported themselves as using a mobile device daily or multiple times
daily. This is in line with the reasoning that lead to the research questions. The
smartphone phone and/or mobile device becoming the preferred delivery point for
content.
Frequency of Mobile Device Use
gender

Mean

N

Std. Deviation

Female

4.77

26

.652

Male

4.94

17

.243

Prefer not to answer

5.00

1

.

Total

4.84

44

.526

Figure 27. Frequency of Mobile Device Use Mean and Standard Deviation
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Frequency of Smartphone Use

40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5

Total

0
occasionally
2

Daily
Multiple/daily

4

5

Total

2
occasionally
1

4
Daily
4

5
Multiple/daily
39

Figure 28. Frequency of Mobile Device Use

In summary, the subjects were two-thirds female, well-educated, technologically
adept and daily users of mobile devices. Gender, age, and educational level were not
analyzed as part of the hypotheses of the study. Use of a smartphone and technology
expertise were required for successful completion.
4.2.2

Successful Usage of the Webapp
As stated in the methodology, the usage of the webapp CLUE determined the

effectiveness of conserving constrained resources in the mobile security interface. The
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first measure taken was successful navigation of the security interface. As described in
Appendix C – Task List for Study Participants, each subject performed a series of tasks.
In these tasks the subject succeeded or failed in navigation of various security interfaces.
The users chose which security mode they preferred to use, and how often they want to
use the webapp. As discussed in 3.3.1, the successful navigation was marked by the
retrieval of clue set by user. Low mode indicated password and userid retrieval success.
Medium indicated userid retrieval. High, the current norm or the control, indicated
success when the user needed no help, and failure when userid or password help was
requested.

Total Sessions for each security mode
1200

1000

800

600
Total

400

200

0
high
fail

high

low
success

Figure 29. Sessions for Each Design Type with Success Rate

med
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This measure shows the trend of the user preferring the low security mode which
has the greatest conservation of constrained resources. It also shows unpopularity of the
medium mode. This unpopularity was predicted by the Cogtool score for the medium
design on the mobile platform and desktop. In Figure 30 the average duration of a
session is compared to the number of total sessions and the total usage. Users who had
the greatest difficulty in the first sessions stopped using the app. Anyone with more than
seven sessions is using the app beyond the minimum listed in the task list. This also
indicates success. Forty-five out of 54 subjects used the app beyond the training, or 83
percent.

Figure 30. Number of session vs Average duration of a session
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Both of these measures indicate a higher level of success when using the webapp
CLUE. The zeroth hypothesis is disproven, and the H1 is proven.
4.2.3

Usage Conserving Constrained Resources
In Phase 1 – CogTool Analysis of Efficiency the seconds consumed by using

power actions involving screen displays and processing was calculated using human
performance modelling. The Cogtool measure of efficiency has been validated by
previous studies (Abdulin 2011; Ocak and Cagiltay 2016) as being accurate for these
actions on mobile. Conservation means the resources are not expended. Every action that
uses a revised design mode conserves the difference between the constrained resources
used by the original design and the revised design. The data about the resources
consumed and conserved appears in Appendix I – Data from usage of Webapp CLUE.
Every action taken in the webapp that corresponds to one of the security tasks in
Table 11 was logged. To calculate the impact of the conservation of constrained
resources, each incidence of the security task was mapped to the measure of resource in
seconds consumed. The measures of resource consumed and conserved appear in
Appendix I – Data from usage of Webapp CLUE. Based on the usage data presented in
4.2.2, subjects preferred the webapp versions that conserved the constrained resources.
The detailed usage describing which security tasks were performed by the users also
shows the users prefer the “low” version of the design. The average amount of
constrained resource conserved per security task is shown in Figure 31. Power is the
resource that is conserved the least. User effort, or cognitive load has the largest amount
of resource conserved.
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9.00

Seconds of constrained resources conserved

8.00

7.00

6.00

5.00
Average of user effort
4.00

Average of form factor
Average of power

3.00

2.00

1.00

0.00

low

med

Average of user effort

7.84

3.04

Average of form factor

5.29

6.64

Average of power

1.02

0.73

Figure 31. Average Constrained Resources Conserved per Task

4.2.4

Phase 2 – Summary of Results
Each category of resource is conserved for both low and medium modes.

Hypothesis 3, which states the artifact will conserve power is supported. Hypothesis 4,
which states the form factor manipulation is supported. Hypothesis 5, which states user
effort will be conserved, is also supported.
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Table 22. Phase 2 usage Hypotheses Proven
Hypothesis

Variables

Indicators

Supported

H0 - no impact

Security mode
Success/Fail

There is no difference in the
amount of successful usage
(Figure 29)

No

H1- will increase the Success/Fail
success
per usage and
Security mode

Security modes with medium
and low security will have a
higher success rate (Figure
29)

Yes

H3 – conserving
power

#screen displays
#processes
# elapsed

Medium and low security
modes consume less power
(Figure 31)

Yes

H4 – reducing
manipulation

#keystrokes
#swipes/taps
#Physical button
push

Medium and low security
modes consume less form
fate (Figure 31)

Yes

H5 – reduce user
effort

# pure recall
# cued recall
# multi-step
sequences

Medium and low security
modes consume less user
effort (Figure 31)

Yes

4.3

Phase 3 SUS Results for User Satisfaction
As stated in the methodology, participants of the study are asked to take a System

Usability Scale (SUS) Survey to assess the webapp. In Phase 2 each subject experienced
the security interface in some of the modes that conserved constrained resources on the
mobile platform. These same modes were analyzed for efficiency in Phase 1 using human
performance modelling.
The subjects accessed the mobile-optimized version of the SUS survey (Figure
17) in a webapp which stored the data in a no-SQL database from Google called Firebase.
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The Firebase data was extracted and converted to Comma Separated Values (CSV)
format. The CSV file was reformatted to present the information needed for SUS
analysis.
The reliability and validity of SUS has been documented by 20 years of SUS
Scores. Reliability refers to the consistent response to the items. SUS detects differences
in smaller sample sizes (as few as two users) and generates reliable results. Validity
refers to whether an instrument measures the target, which for SUS is perceived usability.
SUS has been shown to effectively distinguish between unusable and usable systems and
correlates highly with other questionnaire-based measurements of usability. These
characteristics combine to make SUS an improvement to commercial alternatives and
home-grown questionnaires (Sauro, 2011).

Figure 32. Confidence Interval for SUS Analysis

4.3.1

Confidence Interval of SUS Data
The statistical analysis of the SUS data indicates a confidence interval of 90%.
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The sample size required in SUS study for a margin of 10.0 is 20 subjects, as shown in
Figure 33. The sample size for the SUS data in this research was 22 subjects, which
means the study exceeded the minimum required to achieve this accuracy.

Figure 33. Sample Size Calculation for +/- 10.0 Margin of Error SUS Accuracy
As described in Phase 3 – User Satisfaction, the SUS scale analysis converts the
raw score to a letter grade and a percentile. The letter grade quickly communicates the
usability of the software to the layperson in easily understandable terms. An adjective is
also assigned to the usability ranging from Poor to Excellent to also communicate the
usability in familiar words (Bangor, Kortum, & Miller, 2009). The type of task can affect
the scoring. A single simple task will score lower than a multi-task sequence (Kortum &
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Acemyan, 2013). When the percentile ranking of CLUE is compared to the various
categories the letter grade changes as seen in Figure 34. The SUS analysis tool used to
generate the grade provides both the Bangor value (Bangor et al., 2009) and Lewis and
Sauro value ( Lewis & Sauro, 2009). Bangor sets the scale for the letter grade higher, but
both scores resolve to the same adjective, “Acceptable.”

Figure 34. Summary of SUS Score compared to other software
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The CLUE software has its highest letter grade when compared to cell phones and
business software as also shown in Figure 34. The favorable comparison of CLUE to
other cellphones indicates the mobile design principles improve usability perceived. All
other calculations converting raw SUS scores to percentile also received an acceptable
rating.
Two subscales of the SUS are used to measure learnability and usability (Sauro &
Lewis, 2009). Questions #4 and #10 measure learnability and the other questions measure
usability as successful use of the system. For this study a subscale was added to measure
user effort. These questions addressed user perception of the system’s demand on
cognitive effort. A subscale was also added to address form factor. These questions
addressed the user perception of interaction usability. The results of SUS data analysis
appear in Table 23. The two new subscales were calculated by summing the values of the
relevant questions, and then converting the sum to a percentile.
Table 23. SUS Results for Overall and Subscales
SUS scale name

SUS overall

Usability

Learnability

Cognitive Load

Form Factor

Questions assessed

Description

Percentile

1-10

Entire questionnaire

77.8

1,2,3,5,6,7,8,9

Standard subscale
(Sauro & Lewis, 2009))

77.7

4, 10

Standard subscale
(Sauro & Lewis, 2009)

78.4

4,5,7,10

Questions on cognitive
effort based on
conserved resources

78.8

2,4,6

Questions on form
factor based on
conserved resource

78.1
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The usability as reported by SUS score did not reach the level of the 80th
percentile, which is the score at which a subject would recommend the webapp to a friend
(Sauro, 2011). SUS scores are frequently used to benchmark successive iterations of a
design, as is appropriate for DSR.
4.3.2

Phase 3 – Summary of Results
Based on the data reported above, and the analysis of the hypotheses planned to

be evaluated in Phase 3 had the results listed in Table 24.
Table 24. Hypotheses Results for Phase 3
Hypothesis

Measurement

Measuring success

Supported

H1- increase the
success

Examine questions
about success
(#1,#2,#3,#5,#6,#7,#8,
#9 on SUS)

Favorable rating received
as answers on usability
questions
(Table 23)

Yes

H2 - improve the
user experience

Examine all questions
on SUS overall

Acceptable rating for SUS
overall
(Table 23)

Yes

H4 – reducing
manipulation

Examine questions
Positive rating received as
about manipulating the answers on these questions
system (#2, #6, #8)
(Table 23)

Yes

H5 – conserving
user effort

Examine questions
that address user
cognitive effort (#4,
#5, #7, #10)

Yes

4.4

Positive rating received as
answers on these questions
(Table 23)

Summary
The results of all three phases of the evaluation were reported. Each phase tested

a portion of the hypotheses. The hypotheses tested in each phase and the results were
summarized in a table at the end of each phase as shown in Table 10, Table 13, and Table
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15. As mentioned in 3.3.3, the Cogtool score shows the new security usability principles
improve the security interface on mobile, but not enough to be better than the desktop
interface. As a result, hypothesis 6 is refuted for this artifact. A summary of all
hypotheses and results appears in Table 25.
Table 25. Summary of All Hypotheses Results by Phase
Hypothesis

Phase 1
Supported

Phase 2
Supported

Phase 3
Supported

H0 - no impact

No

No

Not Evaluated

H1- increase the success

Yes

Yes

Yes

H2 - improve the user
experience

Yes

Not Evaluated

Yes

H3 - conserving power

Yes

Yes

Not Evaluated

H4 - reducing manipulation

Yes

Yes

Yes

H5 - conserving user effort

Yes

Yes

Yes

H6- Mobile vs desktop

No

Not Evaluated

Not evaluated
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5.

Chapter 5

Chapter 5
Conclusion

The following section is the final section containing a discussion of the findings
and the importance. The research questions are re-visited in light of the results.
5.1

Conclusions

The first research question is: How does the overlap or conflict between security and
usability impact the design of effective usable security on mobile devices?
By comparing the principles for usability and secure design in 3.1.1 it was shown
that usability is a subset of good security. Applying usability principles to security design
did not weaken the security. Any security that ignores usability principles is also
ignoring principles for good security design. Working from a checklist, however, is an
inaccurate means of applying design principles. Using a human performance modelling
tool like Cogtool provides a communicable measure (seconds elapsed) of the usability of
the design.
The Cogtool graphs provided the evidence of the high cognitive load of the
touchscreen keyboard. Though the ineffectiveness of wholesale transport of workstation
security design to the mobile platform has been called into question by previous research
(Oberheide & Jahanian, 2010), the security model of basic authentication retains a
significant foothold on mobile (Chiang & Chiasson, 2013). The lack of usability of basic
authentication has generated considerable research on alternatives such as pass-faces
(Dunphy, Nicholson, & Olivier, 2008), graphical passwords (Biddle et al., 2012; Bulling,
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Alt, & Schmidt, 2012; Chiang & Chiasson, 2013; Gao et al., 2012; Stobert & Biddle,
2013), pass-chords (Azenkot, Rector, Ladner, & Wobbrock, 2012; Leftheriotis, 2013),
and gestures (Serrano et al., 2013; Singha, Misra, & Laskar, 2016), but basic
authentication is still the most common security model.
The results show interaction with basic authentication on a mobile platform
differs from the workstation resulting in decreased usability. There is hidden cognitive
load in eyes-on input that increases the difficulty of the security interface. The universal
availability of a keyboard-like input and the widespread understanding of the concept of
basic authentication make the low implementation cost almost irresistible to the less
innovative security designer. In the absence of a measure-predicted usability like this
study, the impact of poor choices on input can be disregarded. Similar to the “Don’t Text
and Drive” campaign, eyes-on security like keyboard-based character authentication with
taking over 3 seconds should be blacklisted on mobile as the primary interface.
The usability lessons have been so poorly learned that the paradigm of using a
touchscreen for keyboard has spread to even smaller screens with a similar lack of
success (Withana, Peiris, Samarasekara, & Nanayakkara, 2015). Password meters have
been successful in leading users towards stronger passwords (Carne, Carnavalet, &
Mannan, 2015). Security usability meters that calculate the difficulty of input on various
platforms that could guide security designers toward understanding the cost of their
security choices. For a mobile platform the length of time the user must be “eyes-on”
could a trigger a usability warning.
Common practices supplant best practices when ease of adoption is too high and
the detrimental effects are not clearly understood. At one time changing passwords every
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60 days was best practice for security – now research has clearly shown this not to be the
case. Similarly strong passwords and the current mobile device keyboard used in motion
are usability-incompatible. Even with frequent usage, the sequence of characters inherent
in a strong password cannot be input accurately with the mobile device in motion.
5.2

Implications
When creating design principles it is key to know what needs to be changed. In

3.1.3 conserving the resources of power, form factor, and user effort were identified as
key to achieving usability of mobile security.
The second research question is: Will a set of design principles structured to
conserve constrained resource attain security usability?
The Cogtool score in Phase 1 showed that the design that conserved the
constrained resources would have higher usability (less seconds to navigate). The SUS
score in Phase 3 showed user satisfaction was acceptable but not exceptional. The key to
the lower user satisfaction is in the Phase 2 usage data. When doing keyboard-intensive
tasks to add input to be retrieved during the execution on security tasks, the users shifted
back to a desktop version of the interface.
Though the design does conserve all three constrained resources, the cognitive
load is not sufficiently reduced to make the current design attractive to use outside the
boundaries of the study. The cognitive load comes not only from recall, but from the
manipulation of the touchscreen interface. Unlike a keyboard used with a workstation,
the manipulation of a touchscreen does not benefit from muscle memory to speed the
manipulation of the form factor and relieve the cognitive load of retrieving the password
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(Lu, Yu, Yi, Shi, & Zhao, 2017). The cognitive interaction required by using the eyes to
guide the user’s fingers across the keyboard takes the same amount of time for the novice
user and the expert user. Reducing and/or touchscreen keyboard interaction conserves
both user cognitive effort and form factor manipulation effort.
The lack of popularity of the medium mode was obvious in the usage data (Figure
29). Comments on post-study survey indicated the users felt the cognitive load of
deciding which security mode to use was high. They wanted a location to be safe, and
their interactions with security supported by CLUE, or not safe, which is the current
norm.
Even with the resource conservation, the Cogtool model of the best design
interface on mobile still had a higher time score than the worse design interface on
desktop. This demonstrated by the refutation of H6. Additional design changes to
conserve more constrained resources are needed to make the usability of mobile basic
authentication equal or better than the desktop equivalent.
5.3

Discussion
Creating a new type of security interface runs into obstacles in several areas.

Security research has a history of poor participation (Kotulic & Clark, 2004). Companies
who have had security breaches don’t want to reveal the details because those details can
reveal additional vulnerabilities. When designing security research studies the
investigator must carefully structure the study to protect not only the typical Personally
Identifiable Information (PII) but also security-related information. Strict interpretation
of Institutional Review Board (IRB) policies written to protect human subjects from harm
can also hamper security research (Garfinkel, 2008). In spite of this, security research
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related to psychology, sociology (Siponen, 2005), human interaction and human error
(Sasse, Brostoff, & Weirich, 2001) are critical to solving security issues.
Participation in a security study for individuals is also seen as a risk. In this study
approximately 118 subjects were willing to fill out a survey about security attitudes and
usage, only 44 proceeded to the actual usage of the artifact. The initial recruitment
reached out to 8000 possible subjects. Though no actual passwords were requested in the
study, the potential participants were cautious about revealing their security behaviors.
The subjects were a convenience sample, but recruited from groups where the
investigator had a trusted relationship. Without some trust in the investigator,
participation in security research is seen as a risk. While researchers understand the
oversight provided by IRB approval (Appendix K – IRB Memo), other desirable research
subjects need some sort of certification or seal of approval that identifies research that
will properly protect information about their security behaviors that makes them
vulnerable to social engineering.
New security paradigms are also seen as dangerous because the potential subjects
typically do not understand “the new way” of handling security. In many cases the
subjects do not understand all the risks of the “old way” either, but repeated usages has
overcome their reluctance When it comes to security, erring on the side of the known or
conservative approach makes the subject more comfortable because the potential risks of
revealing personal information are so high. Once again, unless the security researcher or
their organization is trusted, the subjects are reluctant to participate.
This discomfort and distrust point to the need to develop and expand the use of
human performance modelling tools to predict the usability of the interface. Cogtool did
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correctly predict both the increased usability of the mobile security interface once the
design principles were applied. Cogtool also correctly documented even the improved
security interface on mobile was not as easy to use as the worst desktop. The human
performance modelling can provide a measure without revealing the personal security
traits/attitudes/behaviors of individual subjects.
5.3.1

Gaps in the Literature
As discussed in 2.4, current research does not provide design direction security-

usability for mobile separate from desktop. The results of this research show that the
design principles proposed did improve the usability of the security interface on mobile.
The high success rate of users in navigating the revised interface, and the positive SUS
rating demonstrates this.
Prior research does not examine the true cost of the keystroke equivalent on the
mobile platform. Though the accuracy of Cogtool as a predictor of difficulty was
documented on both desktop and mobile, a comparison of the difficulty of repeatedly
using the same security interface on both platforms has not been done. The results show
that input of security information using a keystroke equivalent is almost three times more
difficult than on the desktop. Breaking down the Cogtool measure into the constrained
resources used on the mobile keyboard equivalent revealed the hidden cognitive load on
each stroke that was not decreased by repetition, and not caused by lack of recall. The
nature of touchscreen interaction with no haptic cues like a physical keyboard, and no
development of body memory makes each and every keystroke sequence as difficult as
the one previous.
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Previous research has focused on the use of SUS data to determine user
perception of usability. The generalized nature of the SUS questions does not provide
specific guidance for what to change in a system like the Cogtool mapping to the design.
Phase 1 and 2 provided clearer insight into what to consider for future directions than the
Phase 3 data. Having a metric to aim for (the Cogtool score for basic authentication on
desktop) a method to measure (Cogtool), and specific actions to control/reduce (the
actions that used the resources of power, form factor, user effort) is more attainable by
the security designer than the checklist of principles. Meeting a metric makes
communicating the usability more concrete than an adjective like “good.”
This research looks specifically at security input rather keyboard input in general
on the mobile platform. Security input for basic authentication differs from input for a
text message because of the rules for strong passwords (Horcher & Tejay, 2009). To
prevent a dictionary attack to guess a password, users are encouraged to choose character
sequences that are not typically typed (Topkara, Atallah, & Topkara, 2007). Passwords
that are easily typed by going across a row in in a keyboard (QWERTY) are also
discouraged (Furnell, 2011). Research to improve typing usability on the mobile device
keyboard has focused on predictive text to reduce interaction time (Sandnes, 2015; Trinh,
Waller, Vertanen, Kristensson, & Hanson, 2014). Since strong passwords should fail
predictive text criteria, these algorithms do not improve the accuracy of security input.
Touchscreens also produce higher error rates during movement, and user familiarity does
not improve accuracy (Orphanides & Nam, 2017).
5.4

Recommendations
In spite of receiving security advice suggesting the need to protect data, users still

choose not to protect the data. For instance, Herley observed that security advice is
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getting increasingly complex without a clear positive cost-benefit trade-off for the
additional effort expended by the user (Herley, 2009b). In the absence of an independent
measure of the effort, it is still possible that many users correctly perceive basic
authentication as an unreasonable security hurdle to an application. As an example,
Harbach et al. empirically showed that in 27 days, the participants in their study spent an
average of over an hour each day just unlocking their devices (Harbach, Von Zezschwitz,
Fichtner, De Luca, & Smith, 2014).
When listening to music or talking, individuals are more likely to look at their
device (Schwebel et al., 2012). The danger of cognitive distraction from mobile phone
use reduces situation awareness and increases unsafe behavior (Nasar, Hecht, & Wener,
2008). Pedestrians are at greater risk for accidents, and crime victimization. Every eyeson interaction decreases ability to ambulate due to the need to divide attention between
the screen and the surrounding environment (Laatar, Kachouri, Borji, Rebai, & Sahli,
2017).
The dropped head posture adopted by the user to see the screen affects not only
visibility of surroundings but also balance and gait (Kao, Higginson, Seymour,
Kamerdze, & Higginson, 2015). Dancers and figure skaters have long known the weight
shift caused by a head dropped forward by looking at the ground is detrimental to balance
(United States Figure Skating Association, 1998), even though the weight of the average
human skull is only 10-11 pounds. Eyes-on security input, such as basic authentication,
requires both looking away from the environment to ensure authentication success, and a
dropped head. Disengagement from the environment while the user is in motion even as
a pedestrian decreases usability and safety.
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Distractions caused by mobile phone use while driving have clearly shown the
connection between texting and traffic accidents (Lipovac, Đerić, Tešić, Andrić, &
Marić, 2017). In the United States, hands-on use of a mobile phone has been regulated in
14 states and has resulted in a reduction of traffic accidents particularly for lessexperienced drivers (Zhu, Rudisill, Heeringa, Swedler, & Redelmeier, 2016). There is
conflicting evidence on the impact of conversation as a distraction. Drivers taking calls
related to work experienced a higher level of distraction (Engelberg, Hill, Rybar, & Styer,
2015), but those who were conversing had decreased levels of driver fatigue in a
monotonous driving situation (Saxby, Matthews, & Neubauer, 2017).
The damage done while driving is exacerbated by the distances travelled during
the distraction, roughly 100 yards at 55 mph in 4 seconds (Muttart, Fisher, Knodler, &
Pollatsek, 2007). A typical pedestrian walks at 3 feet per second (Kao et al., 2015)
amounting to a distance travelled of 12 feet. In an urban setting with no barriers between
pedestrians and traffic, plus other obstacles, 4 seconds is more than sufficient to move
from safety to danger (Mwakalonge, Siuhi, & White, 2015).
More complex typing tasks and greater memory recall tasks induce dual-task
interference while walking (Lim, Amado, Sheehan, & Van Emmerik, 2015). The higher
the cognitive load required by input, the less cognition is available for safely navigating
the surroundings. Research to improve typing usability on the mobile device keyboard
has focused on predictive text to reduce interaction time (Sandnes, 2015; Trinh, Waller,
Vertanen, Kristensson, & Hanson, 2014). Since strong passwords should fail predictive
text criteria, these algorithms do not improve the accuracy of security input.
Touchscreens also produce higher error rates during movement, and user familiarity does
not improve accuracy (Orphanides & Nam, 2017).
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The lack of usability for security inputs on a touchscreen also points to a need for
a better design of the touchscreen keyboard construct. Previous work in this area has
focused on auto-correction and predicting input (Al-Khalifa et al. 2014). A security-input
optimized keyboard may alleviate the issues that hamper the usability of touchscreen
input, just as text-optimized keyboards improve text input usability (Bi et al. 2010). The
use of a security-optimized keyboard could be limited to security inputs in the design of
an interface so as to not impact other uses of the keyboard. Alternate versions of
keyboards are already triggered to ease entry of email addresses, URLs and other data
(Hong et al. 2015). A similar technique could be used.
Voice and haptic interfaces have improved to become a viable “eyes-off” option
(Arif, Pahud, Hinckley, & Buxton, 2013). The cognitive load on the mobile user can be
reduced by collecting information about the user from the environment and processing
with artificial intelligence to create conversational interaction (Harris, 2005). Instead of
turning a slab of glass into a bad keyboard, the design principles for usable security must
conserve the constrained resources and exploiting the extended possibilities.
Using GPS location to set the security level of the webapp was appreciated by the
users. No keyboard input was necessary, other than to name the location. To get access
to the most usable security mode, some users would set their current location as “safe”,
and then delete the location after retrieving the desired security hints/clues. This
indicates a need for a time duration of security access. Currently the norm for granting
security access defaults to permanent access. Designing an auto-expiration of 30 minutes
as the default, with the option to select permanent access, would protect the user whose
location may be safe at the time, but not perhaps later. Similarly the user might choose to
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designate a medical facility as safe for a time while assistance is being rendered, and then
have access auto-expire.
Several users suggested the use of pictures to remind themselves of passwords
instead of text strings as their input to the webapp. Others used speech to text capabilities
as an alternative to the mobile keyboard. For exceeding small screens, such as the
smartwatch, one-handed security entry with eyes off is highly desirable. Instead of trying
to type, a series of timed taps could form a pattern for unlocking. Similar to the
passphrase, the user thinks of a rhythmic pattern or song to trigger recall of the
authentication sequence.
As options to the touchscreen keyboard for authentication, drawing a pattern and
fingerprint reading have become popular. Each of these options can be executed “eyesoff” and in less than four seconds, making them safer for mobile authentication in
motion.
5.5

Summary
In this chapter the results communicated in Chapter 4 were mapped to the

research questions. In response to research question 1, usability was shown to be a subset
of security. Good choices in security design lead to good choices for usability and vice
versa. In response to research question 2, the results showed that conserving the
constrained resources identified on mobile (power, form factor, and user effort/cognitive
load) did improve the usability of the security interface and the success rate of navigating
security. However, the comparison to the desktop platform, the improvement still did not
match the usability level of the desktop equivalent. The gaps in the literature identified in

107
the Chapter 2 literature were also mapped to the results. In particular the cost of the
keystroke and the difference between security and normal input have not been examined.
Finally the future directions for research in this area are discussed based on the results of
the research.
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Appendix A - Use Cases Descriptions and Diagrams
The following four security-related tasks describe typical use of basic
authentication.
Task 1: Login Attempt
The login attempt task is mapped to the subject providing the typical basic
authentication input of a UID and password. This path leads to success when the user
knows both the UID and the password.
Task 2: UID Recovery
The UID recovery task is performed when the subject forgets the UID. The
artifact verifies if the UID provided by the user is valid. If it is not valid, the appropriate
message is displayed. Since the UID is typically relatively public (Herley, 2009), as
described earlier, the recovery by an email confirmation to account establishment email.
UID recovery is only needed in a high risk location. UID is pre-filled in low and medium
risk locations.
Task 3: Password Reset
The password reset task occurs when the subject cannot recall the password. The
user requests a reset and receives a temporary password sent to the email account used as
the UID for this authentication. The user must copy the temporary password and provide
a new strong password. The user is also prompted to create a password hint to allow
potential recovery of the password in locations which are low risk.
Task 4: Password Recovery (Get hint)
The password recovery task is only available at a low risk location. It provides
an avenue to successful authentication other than the password reset process. The user
sees the recall cue only if one was set when prompted during password change. The
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diagrams below shows the paths taken through the interface based on location mode.
The four security tasks modelled in the CogTool appear along the path to authentication.

Figure A 1. Use case 1 – User Knows Password and UID
In the first case the user knows the both the UID and the password (
Figure A 1. Use case 1 – User Knows Password and UID ). This is the simplest path.
The user successfully recalls the password and UID from memory, and also successfully
manipulates the form factors of the equipment.

Figure A 2. Use case 2 – User knows password and not UID
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In use case 2 the user knows the password and not the UID. For the security
designs represented as Medium and Low risk there is no need of UID recovery because
the UID is supplied to the user.

Figure A 3. Use Case 3 – User knows UID and not password
In use case 3 the user knows the UID and not the password (Figure A 3. Use
Case 3 – User knows UID and not password). For the security designs represented as
Medium and High there is no option of password recovery because a password hint is
only available in Low risk mode. In Medium mode the password recovery is presented
but the user will not receive a password clue because of the risk level. Medium and High
designs must go through the password reset to achieve success, which requires much
more manipulation of the security interface than the password recovery. The Low risk
mode displays a password clue which allows the user to retrieve the password from
memory using cued recall instead of the free recall that is the only option available in
Medium and High risk designs.
In use case 4 the user doesn’t know the UID or the password (Figure A 4). In the security
interface design for High risk, the user must recover the UID and reset the password to
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achieve successful authentication. In the security interface design for Medium risk the
UID is supplied so only the password reset task is needed to achieve successful
authentication. Finally the security interface design for Low risk mode only uses the
password recovery task, similar to use case 3.

Figure A 4. Use Case 4 - User does not know UID or Password
Each security task receives a CogTool score indicating its difficulty in seconds
elapsed. The score for each security mode will be based on adding up the score of the
security tasks that make up the path from choice of site to success in site access.

112

Appendix B - CogTool Wireframes
CogTool is an open source, general purpose user interface prototyping tool
developed at Carnegie-Mellon University. It uses a human performance model to
automatically evaluate how efficiently a skilled user can complete a task. In this study it
is used to measure the efficiency of three versions of basic authentication on both desktop
and mobile devices.
To use Cogtool a designer creates a storyboard of a design. In this study images
of the actual screens were used to produce the story board. The tasks included in
navigating the security interface were demonstrated by interacting with the storyboard
like the software. As a result CogTool creates a baseline of the current version of basic
authentication on mobile and desktop, and measures the improvements made by
conserving constrained resources on mobile.

Figure B 1. High Risk Desktop Design in CogTool
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Figure B 2. Medium Risk Desktop Design in CogTool
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Figure B 3. Low Risk Desktop Design in CogTool
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Figure B 4. High Risk Mobile Design
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Figure B 5. Medium Risk Mobile Design
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Figure B 6. Low Risk Mobile Design
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Appendix C – Task List for Study Participants
The study participants received links to a web page with instructions to perform a
task. There was a signup task, nine tasks interacting with the Get My CLUE app, and one
task filling out the post-study survey. The links were delivered via email and text
message.
Group 1 – Add a Website
1. Sign In to Get My Clue (above) and complete the tasks on this list
2. Click the button below to go to Get My Clue
3. Click on Menu --> Websites
4. Click on
5. Choose Select Website from the list
6. Choose a website off the list
7. Hit submit to see it on your list of websites
Group 2 - Add userid and Passwords to a Website
1. Sign In to Get My Clue (above) and complete the tasks on this list
2. Click the button below to go to Get My Clue
3. Click on Menu --> Websites
4. Click on any website from the list
5. Add a userid clue and a password clue if prompted. Then click on the website
again
Group 3 – The home screen carousel
1. Sign In to Get My Clue (above) and complete the tasks on this list
2. Click the button below to go to Get My Clue
3. Click on large icon of any web site in the carousel

119
4. Click on to see a userid hint
5. Click on to see a userid hint
6. Click on to see a password hint
7. Click Menu --> Sign out.
8. Click the button Confirm Sign out.
Group 4 - Change your Password
1. Type the wrong password above and click on Sign In (above)
2. Click on to see a password hint
3. Click on Forgot Password
4. Check your email for the temporary password and copy it into the screen
5. Put in a new password and hit Change Password
6. if you do not have a password hint, you will see a prompt to provide a password
hint (You will be prompted to do this every time you start a session until you set a
hint)
7. Click the button below to go to Get My Clue
Group 5 – Set a new Password Hint
1. Sign In to Get My Clue (above) and complete the tasks on this list
2. Since you changed your password you might need a new hint. Click below to
Change Get My CLUE Password Hint
3. Put in a new password hint for Get My CLUE
4. Click Add Get My CLUE Password Hint to update your password clue.
5. Click the button below to go to Get My Clue
Group 6 – Add categories to determine risk for websites
1. Sign In to Get My Clue (above) and complete the tasks on this list
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2. Click the button below to go to Get My Clue
3. Click on Menu --> Websites
4. Click on Search
5. Type part of a category name or website name. The website list will show only
the sites that meet your search.
Group 7 – Add password hint
1. Sign In to Get My Clue (above) and complete the tasks on this list
2. Click below to Change Get My CLUE Password Hint
3. Put in a new password hint for Get My CLUE
4. Click Add Get My CLUE Password Hint to update your password clue.
5. Click the button below to go to Get My Clue
Group 8 - Add locations and use web app in different locations
1. Sign In to Get My Clue (above) and complete the tasks on this list
2. Click the button below to go to Get My Clue
3. Click on Menu --> Locations
4. Click to add a new location
5. Choose a risk level for your current location
6. Type a short name for your location
7. Type a description for your location
8. Click Submit new to add your current location. If you are at a location already in
your locations, you will see an error message
9. Click on Menu --> Websites
10. Choose any website and click on it
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Group 9a – Use the web application in a new location. User must be in a new location
1. Sign In to Get My Clue (above) and complete the tasks on this list
2. Make sure you are in a location different from the previous task
3. Click the button below to go to Get My Clue
4. Click on Menu --> Locations
5. Click to add a new location
6. Add your current location as medium risk
7. Remember to Submit New for the new location
8. Refresh your screen
9. Click on Menu -- > Websites Notice that the password clue does not appear
10. Choose any website and click on it
Group 9b – Repeat previous task group in a new location
1. Sign In to Get My Clue (above) and complete the tasks on this list
2. Make sure you are in a location different from the previous task
3. Click the button below to go to Get My Clue
4. Click on Menu --> Locations
5. Click to add a new location
6. Add your current location as medium risk
7. Remember to Submit New for new location
8. Refresh your screen
9. Click on Menu -- > Websites Notice that the password clue does not appear
10. Choose any website and click on it
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Appendix D – Experimental Procedure Checklist
1. Have potential subjects fill out the pre-study survey from Appendix E. The
informed consent form is included in the survey. Subjects who do not give
consent are removed from the study at this point and their data discarded.
2. Extract data from pre-study survey on websites commonly used by the subject and
pre-load information into the CLUE web application to decrease the configuration
needed by the subject before achieving any meaningful usage.
3. Add subject email provided after consent to the data table listing emails allowed
to use the web application.
4. Send email and text message to the potential subject with a link to create an
account in the Get My CLUE app.
5. After confirming the subject signed up by checking the list of users in Firebase
authentication, add the subject to the list of subjects being directed through the
tasks of the study.
6. Send a text and email daily to direct the subject to perform the nine groups of
tasks listed in Appendix C. Group 9 involved 2 emails and task messages to
direct the subject through tasks at different points in the day.
7. Send the subject a link in email and text to complete the final survey.
8. Send the subject a link in email and text to request a gift card.
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Appendix E – Pre-Study Questionnaire
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Appendix F - CogTool Mapping Data
CogTool measures for the security interface designs created using the design
principles that conserve the constrained resources appear below.

Figure F 1. CogTool Measures for Get My CLUE, high Desktop is current norm

131

Appendix G – Data Definitions of Firebase Usage Data
The data for Phase 2 was collected using a webapp written in AngularJS
framework. The data was store in the NoSQL database Firebase provided by Google.
The data was extracted from Firebase in CSV files and loaded to Excel and SPSS for
analysis.
Common Fields
Field name
transID
firebaseUID

Type
String
String

Description
Firebase generated unique transaction identifier
Unique identifier for Firebase user created when user
registers
startedAt
Timestamp Time in milliseconds from January 1, 1960. Recorded
when action starts
Email
Email
Email address of the user (used before FirebaseUID is
generated)
endedAt
Timestamp Time in milliseconds from January 1, 1960.
url
URL
Universal Resource Locator for a web page
security_mode String
High, medium, or low. High is the control condition
Startdate
Timestamp Time and date an event started DOW MMM DD YYYY
HH:MM:SS
Userid
String
User identifier (email)
userkey
String
User identifier BTOA
category
String
Category for the transaction (depends on table)
Appname
String
Application name
Data Source Tables From FireBase
o

o

answers - answers to the SUS survey
 Unique Transaction ID

answer 
answerval

email

firebaseUID

qname

startedAt
clues – successful uses of the app to retrieve clues based on security mode
 Unique Transaction ID

appname

category

firebaseUID
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o

o

o

o

o

security_mode
startdate
startedAt
url
userid
userkey
comments – comments made at end of post-study survey
 Unique Transaction ID

answer

email

firebaseUID

startedAt
users – information about user approved locations
 userkey

email

firebaseUID

geofire – GeoFire info on locations

locations – descriptive info on locations

nickname – location nickname

pwc – password clue for GetMyCLUE

websites
gmcClues – uses of clues to access apps
 Unique Transaction ID

appname

category

firebaseUID

security_mode

startdate

startedAt

url

userid

userkey
gmcClues – session information on use of the GetMyCLUE app
 Unique Transaction ID

appname

category

firebaseUID

security_mode

startdate

startedAt

url

userid

userkey
resetpw – password resets for CLUE

Unique Transaction ID

appname

startdate
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o

o

startedAt
userid
userkey
sessions –session information for CLUE

Unique Transaction ID

enddate

endedAt

firebaseUID

mobileDevice

startdate

startedAt

userid

userkey
taskusage – CLUE usage for specific tasks

Unique Transaction ID

appname

category

firebaseUID

security_mode

startdate

startedAt

url

userid

userkey
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Appendix H – Recruitment and Demographic Data
This appendix includes information about both the potential pool of subjects and
the pool that proceeded to the study. The findings discuss the difficulties of getting
participation in security research. The high attrition rate of subjects demonstrates this.
Unlike typical information systems research, the women outnumber the men two to one.
This is due to the convenience sample containing, among others, a large group of
technical women.

Gender Distribution of Potential Subjects
90

80

70

60

50

40

38

30

20

10
2
0

Total

Female

78

Male

38

Prefer not to answer

2

Figure H 1. Gender Distribution of Potential Subjects
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Technology Expertise vs Gender for Subjects
12
10
8
6
Female
4

Male
Prefer not to answer

2
0

fair

good

very good

excellent

2

3

4

5

Female

2

7

11

6

Male

1

8

6

2

Prefer not to answer

1

Figure H 2. Technology Expertise vs. Gender for Subjects

Technology Expertise vs age for Subjects
100%
90%
80%

70%
60%
50%
40%

good - 3

30%

excellent - 5

20%

very good - 4

10%
0%

fair - 2
18-27
28-37
38-47
48-57
58-67
years old years old years old years old years old

good - 3

41%

20%

0%

20%

50%

excellent - 5

0%

80%

33%

40%

25%

very good - 4

48%

0%

67%

20%

25%

fair - 2

11%

0%

0%

20%

0%

Figure H 3. Technology Expertise vs. age for Subjects
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Appendix I – Data from usage of Webapp CLUE
“High mobile” and “High desktop” represent the current norm. The effort conserved is
the difference between the effort consumed by a security task in control mode and the
effort consumed in the revised mode (Table I 2). There were 1700 separate uses of the
webapp to navigate the security interface.
Table I 1. Constrained Resource Consumed by Security Task and Risk
Row Labels Clue
form factor
Logon
Attempt
URL
Password
recovery
Clue
UID
recovery
Userid
Password
reset
power
Logon
Attempt
URL
Password
recovery
Clue
UID
recovery
Userid
Password
reset
user effort
Logon
Attempt
URL
Password
recovery
Clue
UID
recovery
Userid
Password
reset

High
Med
Low
High
Mobile Mobile Mobile Desktop
27.6
14.6
11.9

Med
Low
Desktop Desktop
30.5
17.2
14.1

16.4

7.2

7.2

14

7.2

7.2

3.7

3.7

1

5

5

1.9

3.8

0

0

6.5

0

0

3.7
8

3.7
6.5

3.7
4.5

5
6

5
4.5

5
3

1.5

0.5

0.5

1.5

0.5

0.5

3

3

1

2

2

0.5

0.5

0

0

0.5

0

0

3
144

3
111.6

3
73.2

2
54

2
48

2
32.4

50.4

25.2

25.2

9.6

7.2

7.2

43.2

43.2

4.8

20.4

20.4

4.8

7.2

0

0

3.6

0

0

43.2

43.2

43.2

20.4

20.4

20.4
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Table I 2. Seconds of Time Conserved Using the Revised Design.
Clue
form factor
Logon
Attempt
Password
recovery
UID
recovery
Password
reset
power
Logon
Attempt
Password
recovery
UID
recovery
Password
reset
user effort
Logon
Attempt
Password
recovery
UID
recovery
Password
reset

High
Mobile

Med
Mobile

Low
Mobile

High
Desktop

Med
Desktop

Low
Desktop

URL

0

9.2

9.2

0

6.8

6.8

Clue

0

0

2.7

0

0

3.1

Userid

0

3.8

3.8

0

6.5

6.5

0

0

0

0

0

0

URL

0

1

1

0

1

1

Clue

0

0

2

0

0

1.5

Userid

0

0.5

0.5

0

0.5

0.5

0

0

0

0

0

0

URL

0

25.2

25.2

0

2.4

2.4

Clue

0

0

38.4

0

0

15.6

Userid

0

7.2

7.2

0

3.6

3.6

0

0

0

0

0

0

138

Appendix J – Calculations for System Usability Scale
This appendix contains all the calculations for changing the raw SUS score to a
percentile rank for the five different categories of software. All the categories could be
used to describe the CLUE webapp. Though the actual SUS score doesn’t change, the
same score varies in how it compares to other products in a category.

Figure J 1. SUS Calculation CLUE vs All ProductsFigure
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Figure J 2. SUS Score for GMC vs. Business Software

Figure J 3. SUS Score for GMC vs. Consumer SoftwareFigure J 1.
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Figure J 4. SUS Score for GMC vs. Websites.

Figure J 5. SUS Score for GMC vs. Cellphones
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Appendix K – IRB Memo

NOVA SOUTHEASTERN
UNIVERSITY
Office of Grants and Contracts
Institutional Review Board

MEMORANDUM
To:

From:

Ann-Marie Horcher

Ling Wang, Ph.D.
Institutional Review Board
Signature
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Date:

Dec. 8, 2014

Re:
Evaluation of a mobile security Interface designed with security usability
principles to conserve constrained resources

IRB Approval Number: wang07151401

I have reviewed the above-referenced research protocol at the center level. Based on the
information provided, I have determined that this study is exempt from further IRB
review. You may proceed with your study as described to the IRB. As principal
investigator, you must adhere to the following requirements:

1)

CONSENT: If recruitment procedures include consent forms these must be
obtained in such a manner that they are clearly understood by the subjects and the
process affords subjects the opportunity to ask questions, obtain detailed answers
from those directly involved in the research, and have sufficient time to consider
their participation after they have been provided this information. The subjects
must be given a copy of the signed consent document, and a copy must be placed
in a secure file separate from de-identified participant information. Record of
informed consent must be retained for a minimum of three years from the
conclusion of the study.
2) ADVERSE REACTIONS: The principal investigator is required to notify the
IRB chair and me (954-262-5369 and 954-262-2020 respectively) of any adverse
reactions or unanticipated events that may develop as a result of this study.
Reactions or events may include, but are not limited to, injury, depression as a
result of participation in the study, life-threatening situation, death, or loss of
confidentiality/anonymity of subject. Approval may be withdrawn if the problem is
serious.
3) AMENDMENTS: Any changes in the study (e.g., procedures, number or types
of subjects, consent forms, investigators, etc.) must be approved by the IRB prior to
implementation. Please be advised that changes in a study may require further
review depending on the nature of the change. Please contact me with any
questions regarding amendments or changes to your study.
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The NSU IRB is in compliance with the requirements for the protection of human
subjects prescribed in Part 46 of Title 45 of the Code of Federal Regulations (45 CFR
46) revised June 18, 1991.
Cc:

Protocol File
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